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  When scholars and policymakers consider proposals for 
specialized courts, they are usually—and appropriately—mindful of 
the potential effects of specialization on the adjudication of cases. 
Focusing on the immigration field, this Article considers these 
potential effects in relation to other attributes of adjudication: the 
difficulty of cases, the severe caseload pressures, and the strong 
hierarchical controls that are each important attributes at some or all 
levels of the adjudication system. Specifically, this Article discusses 
the effects of those attributes, the effects of judicial specialization, and 
the intertwining of the two. It applies that analysis to proposals to 
substitute some type of specialized court for the federal courts of 
appeals in the adjudication of immigration cases. The Article 
concludes that the impact of adopting such a proposal could be 
substantial but that it is also quite uncertain. To a considerable degree, 
the impact depends on the form of specialization adopted and on 
other provisions of the legislation that creates a specialized court. 
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The adjudication1 of immigration cases has been the subject of 
serious concerns. Heavy caseload pressures and evidence of other 
problems in the adjudication process have generated doubts about 
the quality of decisionmaking in the administrative tribunals that 
handle immigration cases.2 Great disparities in decisional tendencies 
among the immigration judges who handle asylum cases in the first 
 
 1. Among immigration practitioners, the term “adjudication” is often used to refer to 
administrative review of applications and petitions. In this Article, I use the term in its more 
conventional sense to refer to decisionmaking in a judicial setting, both within the Justice 
Department (immigration courts and the Board of Immigration Appeals) and in the federal 
courts. 
 2. See, e.g., Sydenham B. Alexander III, A Political Response to Crisis in the Immigration 
Courts, 21 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 18–21 (2006) (describing working conditions in the courts that 
jeopardize the immigration adjudication system). 
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instance have led to uncertainty about the fairness of the adjudication 
system.3 Evidence of an effort to manipulate the policies of the Board 
of Immigration Appeals (BIA) through selective removals of judges 
has raised questions about the independence of adjudicators.4 Finally, 
substantial growth in the numbers of immigration cases brought to 
the federal courts of appeals has put pressure on judges in some 
circuits.5 
Inevitably, policymakers and commentators have responded to 
these concerns with an array of proposals for changes in the 
adjudication system. Indeed, substantial changes in the administrative 
tribunals have already been made. In turn, some of those changes 
have been criticized on the ground that they create new problems.6 
One category of proposals involves the assignment of cases from 
one or more levels of the adjudication structure to a specialized 
court.7 Not only are these proposals important in themselves, but they 
also highlight the importance of specialization in the adjudication of 
immigration cases. In this Article, I consider the issue of court 
specialization in the field of immigration. To do so, I place 
specialization in the context of other attributes of adjudication in this 
field. 
The central theme of this Article is that the impact of judicial 
specialization is complex and contingent on other conditions. 
Specialization potentially has major consequences for legal 
decisionmaking, but these consequences are not uniform and 
straightforward. In analyzing the desirability of judicial specialization, 
it is necessary to take complexity and contingency into account. 
 
 3. Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew I. Schoenholtz & Philip G. Schrag, Refugee Roulettee: 
Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295, 325–49 (2007) (presenting data 
illustrating the disparities); see also id. at 305 (“[T]he outcome of a refugee’s quest for safety in 
America should be influenced more by law and less by a spin of the wheel of fate that assigns 
her case to a particular government official.”). 
 4. See, e.g., Stephen H. Legomsky, Deportation and the War on Independence, 91 
CORNELL L. REV. 369, 375–79 (2006) (expressing concern over former Attorney General 
Ashcroft’s reassignment of judges). 
 5. John R.B. Palmer, The Nature and Causes of the Immigration Surge in the Federal 
Courts of Appeals: A Preliminary Analysis, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 13, 14 (2006). 
 6. For a discussion of the changes made in BIA procedures in 1999 and 2002 to deal with 
backlogs of cases and criticisms of the 2002 changes, see John R.B. Palmer, Stephen W. Yale-
Loehr & Elizabeth Cronin, Why Are So Many People Challenging Board of Immigration 
Appeals Decisions in Federal Court? An Empirical Analysis of the Recent Surge in Petitions for 
Review, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 23–32 (2005). 
 7. For a more detailed discussion, see infra Part III.C. 
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Part I of this Article sets specialization aside and examines three 
other dimensions of adjudication in the immigration field, which I 
label attributes: the difficulty of cases, the extent of caseload 
pressures on adjudicators, and the degree of control by higher 
authorities. These attributes of adjudication are important in shaping 
the behavior of decisionmakers and the outcomes of the cases they 
decide. Thus, it is worthwhile to probe their effects in light of what is 
known about judicial decisionmaking more generally. For purposes of 
this Article, however, the primary significance of these attributes is 
their relationship with specialization. 
Part II turns to judicial specialization as a general phenomenon. 
It begins by surveying potential effects of specialization on the 
process of adjudication and the outputs of legal decisionmakers. It 
then turns to the attributes of case difficulty, caseload pressure, and 
control of judges, and raises two issues: how specialization might 
affect these attributes, and how these attributes might condition the 
effects of specialization. 
Part III brings together specialization and the attributes of 
adjudication in the immigration field. It begins by examining the 
specialization of immigration courts8 and the BIA, and the impact of 
that specialization. It then examines the courts of appeals, generalist 
bodies that have developed a degree of specialization in immigration 
through the increased flow of immigration cases to them. Finally, it 
considers proposals to replace court of appeals review of executive-
branch decisions in the immigration field with review by a more 
specialized body. Taking into account the other attributes of 
adjudication in the immigration field and the effects of specialization, 
this Part analyzes the potential impact of these proposals. It 
concludes that a wide range of effects is possible, depending on the 
form of the proposal adopted and the conditions under which a 
specialized court operates. 
Before turning to this Article’s central concerns, it is useful to 
sketch out the basic structure of adjudication in immigration law. 
Three sets of legal decisionmakers play the most important roles in 
immigration adjudication: immigration judges, members of the BIA 
who hear appeals from decisions of immigration judges, and judges 
on the federal courts of appeals who hear petitions for review of BIA 
decisions. This Article focuses on these three sets of judges. Other 
 
 8. In this Article, the term “immigration courts” refers specifically to the trial-level bodies 
in which immigration judges serve. 
BAUM IN FINAL.DOC 3/30/2010  6:02:36 AM 
2010] JUDICIAL SPECIALIZATION 1505 
decisionmakers participating in immigration cases include asylum 
officers, who make preliminary judgments about certain asylum 
applications;9 the attorney general, who can intervene in cases within 
the Department of Justice (DOJ);10 federal district court judges, who 
hear criminal immigration cases;11 and the Supreme Court, which can 
accept petitions for certiorari after court of appeals decisions.12 
Immigration judges are located in the Executive Office for 
Immigration Review (EOIR) in the DOJ.13 The attorney general 
officially appoints immigration judges, but EOIR effectively makes 
the selection during most periods.14 As of December 2009, there were 
about 240 immigration judges sitting in fifty-four immigration courts 
across the country.15 Immigration judges act as trial-level 
decisionmakers in several types of immigration cases. The 
overwhelming majority of these cases—about 98 percent in recent 
 
 9. Asylum officers hear applications for asylum that are made outside the context of 
proceedings to remove individuals from the United States. See infra notes 23–24 and 
accompanying text. 
 10. Immigration judges and BIA members act on behalf of the attorney general, who can 
override their decisions. In practice, the attorney general intervenes only after BIA review of an 
immigration judge’s decision. It was reported in 2006 that the attorney general had reviewed 
only twenty-five BIA decisions in fifteen years. Immigration Litigation Reduction: Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 67 (2006) (statement of Jonathan Cohn, 
Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice). 
 11. Federal district court judges hear cases arising from criminal prosecutions of individuals 
for violation of immigration laws. In 2008, immigration offenses accounted for 34 percent of all 
criminal cases commenced in the district courts, and they constituted a majority of criminal 
cases in some districts. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE 
UNITED STATES COURTS: 2009 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 227–32 (2010), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2009/JudicialBusinespdfversion.pdf. 
 12. The Supreme Court hears a fairly small number of cases that directly involve 
interpretation of the immigration laws—by one count, about one case per term on average 
during the 1953–2008 terms—although many other cases involve or affect immigrants. The 
count is based on analysis of the issue codings in The Supreme Court Database, compiled 
primarily by Harold Spaeth. See The Supreme Court Database, http://scdb.wustl.edu/ (last 
visited Mar. 28, 2010). 
 13. For a summary of the history that led to the current status and role of immigration 
judges (and of the BIA) in the adjudication of cases, see Dory Mitros Durham, The Once and 
Future Judge: The Rise and Fall (and Rise?) of Independence in U.S. Immigration Courts, 81 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 655, 661–80 (2006). 
 14. OFFICE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY & OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE, AN INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS OF POLITICIZED HIRING BY MONICA 
GOODLING AND OTHER STAFF IN THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 71–72, 114–15 
(2008), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/s0807/final.pdf; Michele Benedetto, Crisis 
on the Immigration Bench: An Ethical Perspective, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 467, 473 (2008). 
 15. This figure was calculated from lists of judges at the EOIR website. EOIR, U.S. Dep’t 
of Justice, EOIR Immigration Court Listing, http://www.justice.gov/eoir/sibpages/ ICadr.htm 
(last visited Mar. 28, 2010). 
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years—are proceedings to remove noncitizens from the United 
States.16 
The BIA is also located in EOIR.17 The attorney general 
appoints members of the BIA.18 The BIA hears appeals from 
decisions of immigration judges and from certain types of decisions by 
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS); in fiscal year 2009, 89 
percent of BIA cases came from immigration courts.19 
Judges on the federal courts of appeals hear petitions for review 
of BIA decisions that were unfavorable to individuals, as well as a 
smaller number of appeals from district court decisions that involve 
immigration.20 The courts of appeals cannot reach final decisions in 
favor of individuals who have brought petitions for review; rather, 
they are limited to remanding cases to the BIA for reconsideration.21 
A range of issues arises in the cases that these adjudicators 
address, but the issue that receives the greatest attention is asylum. 
Noncitizens may apply for asylum to remain in the United States; to 
be successful, they must establish that they are refugees as defined by 
federal law.22 Applications may be either defensive—that is, made as a 
defense in proceedings to remove a noncitizen from the United 
States—or affirmative—that is, made by a noncitizen in a separate 
 
 16. See EOIR, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY 2009 STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK, at C3 tbl.3, C4 
tbl.4 (2010) (showing the number of proceedings of each type received and completed by 
immigration courts in fiscal year 2009). For a description of the steps involved in removal 
proceedings, see U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, NO. GAO-06-771, EXECUTIVE OFFICE 
FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW: CASELOAD PERFORMANCE REPORTING NEEDS IMPROVEMENT 
10 (2006). 
 17. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a)(1) (2009). 
 18. Id. 
 19. See EOIR, supra note 16, at T2 tbl.17 (showing the number of cases completed by the 
BIA that came from immigration courts). The government makes a small percentage of the 
appeals to the BIA, about 6 percent in fiscal year 2005. Immigration Litigation Reduction, supra 
note 10, at 43 (prepared response of Jonathan Cohn, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Civil 
Division, U.S. Department of Justice, to questions submitted by Sen. Leahy, Member, S. Comm. 
on the Judiciary) (providing a chart of BIA outcomes). 
 20. Formally, the courts of appeals review orders to remove individuals from the U.S., 
rather than BIA decisions. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1) (2006) (providing for judicial review of 
removal orders). Of the 57,740 cases commenced in the courts of appeals across all fields in 
fiscal year 2009, 7,518 were petitions for review of decisions by the BIA and 1,690 were appeals 
from the district courts in criminal cases involving immigration offenses. ADMIN. OFFICE OF 
THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 11, at 90, 94. 
 21. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(4)(B). 
 22. See id. § 1101(a)(42) (establishing refugee qualifications). 
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proceeding before an asylum officer in the DHS.23 If an affirmative 
application is not granted and the applicant “appears to be 
inadmissible or deportable,” the asylum officer refers the case to an 
immigration judge for a removal proceeding in which the asylum 
application is considered.24 EOIR data indicate that in fiscal year 
2009, about one in eight cases received by immigration courts 
involved asylum issues, a decline from one in five in 2007.25 The great 
majority of cases that reach the courts of appeals involve asylum 
claims because, in 1996, Congress eliminated the right to petition the 
courts of appeals to review BIA decisions in most other types of 
cases.26 
I.  ATTRIBUTES OF ADJUDICATION IN THE IMMIGRATION FIELD 
The attributes of adjudication affect the choices of legal 
decisionmakers. These attributes structure and shape judges’ choices 
in powerful ways, and they differ across fields of legal policy and 
among adjudicative bodies within those fields. There are several 
attributes of adjudication, but the three dimensions considered in this 
Part are especially important, and each has a substantial effect on the 
decisions made by judges in the immigration field. 
The first dimension is the degree of difficulty of the cases 
presented to decisionmakers. Immigration cases are unusually 
difficult, primarily because of the ambiguity of relevant facts. This 
difficulty is particularly great for immigration judges, and it has 
fundamental effects on the adjudication of individual cases. 
 
 23. See TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE, THE ASYLUM PROCESS 
(2006), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/159/ (explaining affirmative and defensive asylum 
applications). 
 24. 8 C.F.R. § 208.14(c)(1) (2009). For a summary of the procedures, see Stephen H. 
Legomsky, Learning to Live with Unequal Justice: Asylum and the Limits to Consistency, 60 
STAN. L. REV. 413, 418 (2007). 
 25. See EOIR, supra note 16, at C3 tbl.3, I1 fig.13 (finding that 39,279 of 327,735 cases 
received in 2009 involved asylum issues, compared with 57,139 of 279,436 in 2007). 
 26. The chief judge of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reported in 2006 that 
more than 90 percent of the petitions for review of BIA decisions in his court raised asylum 
issues. Immigration Litigation Reduction, supra note 10, at 5 (testimony of John M. Walker, Jr., 
C.J., U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit); see also Lenni B. Benson, You Can’t Get 
There from Here: Managing Judicial Review of Immigration Cases, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 405, 
425 (reporting similar estimates for the Second Circuit). For a discussion of congressional efforts 
to limit review in 1996, see generally Donald S. Dobkin, Court Stripping and Limitations on 
Judicial Review of Immigration Cases, 28 JUST. SYS. J. 104 (2007). 
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The second dimension is the extent of time pressures on 
decisionmakers. Judges within the DOJ, who undertake the first two 
stages of decisionmaking in immigration cases, are under very heavy 
time pressure. Judges on the federal courts of appeals, responsible for 
the third stage, feel more limited pressure. But the sharp increase in 
the number of immigration cases that appellate judges receive has 
heightened that pressure in some circuits. 
The third dimension is control of decisionmakers by others, 
primarily officials who stand above them in the formal hierarchy. 
Even judges on the courts of appeals are under some hierarchical 
control from the Supreme Court. The degree of hierarchical control is 
far greater for adjudicators within administrative agencies, however, 
and in some respects, controls on immigration judges and members of 
the BIA have become tighter over time. 
A. The Difficulty of Cases 
Whatever their mix of motives may be, one goal of judges is to 
make decisions that are legally accurate; that is, decisions that apply 
the relevant legal rules properly to the facts.27 The difficulty that 
judges face in making accurate decisions varies across cases, and that 
variation is sometimes summarized (and, of course, oversimplified) in 
terms of a distinction between easy and hard cases.28 
In turn, the distinction between easy and hard cases links to the 
differences between appellate courts with primarily mandatory 
jurisdiction and those with primarily discretionary jurisdiction. In 
courts that must decide essentially all appeals they receive, judges 
consider a high proportion of their cases to be easy to decide because 
there is one obvious outcome under the law.29 In contrast, case 
 
 27. In this Article, I do not directly address the debate among legal scholars and political 
scientists about the relative importance of legal and policy considerations in judicial 
decisionmaking. For a discussion of the differing positions, see LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND 
THEIR AUDIENCES: A PERSPECTIVE ON JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 5–9 (2006). I think that these two 
types of considerations are intertwined in judges’ choices, in that judges typically seek to make 
what they consider good law, but their judgments often are influenced heavily by their policy 
preferences. For further elaboration, see infra note 30. However, this Article’s conclusions 
about judicial specialization and its relationship with other attributes of adjudication do not rest 
on a particular position on the roles of legal and policy considerations in judicial decisions. 
 28. E.g., Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1058–60 (1975); Frank H. 
Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 802, 805–07 (1982). 
 29. Ruggero J. Aldisert, Philosophy, Jurisprudence, and Jurisprudential Temperament of 
Federal Judges, 20 IND. L. REV. 453, 462, 466 (1987) (discussing the federal courts of appeals); 
Harry T. Edwards, The Judicial Function and the Elusive Goal of Principled Decisionmaking, 
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selection on courts with discretionary jurisdiction tends to weed out 
the easy cases, so that judges make a high proportion of decisions, 
perhaps the great majority, in cases they perceive to be hard.30 
Decisionmaking differs in important ways between the trial and 
appellate levels, and conceptions of judicial behavior cannot 
necessarily be imported from one to the other.31 But cases at the trial 
level also differ in the degree of difficulty they pose for judges. At the 
trial level, a case may be difficult because legal standards are 
imprecise, the facts are uncertain, or both. 
In the form that they take before immigration judges, 
immigration cases are often difficult. For one thing, some applicable 
legal standards in immigration law are quite imprecise. One example 
is the rule that a deportable individual may avoid removal from the 
United States if “removal would result in exceptional and extremely 
unusual hardship” to a family member who is a lawful resident of the 
United States.32 Of course, imprecise statutory language is not 
unusual. More importantly, the facts to which judges must apply these 
imprecise standards may be impossible to ascertain with any 
confidence.33 Thus, immigration judges frequently face daunting tasks. 
Decisions whether to grant asylum are particularly difficult. 
Deportable individuals may avoid removal if they establish that they 
 
1991 WISC. L. REV. 837, 856–58 (same); John T. Wold, Going Through the Motions: The 
Monotony of Appellate Court Decisionmaking, 62 JUDICATURE 58, 62–63 (1978) (discussing the 
California Courts of Appeal). 
 30. Easterbrook, supra note 28, at 805–07. Commentators tend to share judges’ perceptions 
of differences between appellate courts with mostly mandatory jurisdiction and those with 
mostly discretionary jurisdiction. It is primarily because of this shared perception that some 
scholars conclude that legal considerations play little or no role in Supreme Court 
decisionmaking. See, e.g., JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT 
AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 44–85 (2002) (describing the futility of using legal 
considerations to fully explain decisionmaking); Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court, 2004 
Term—Foreword: A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31, 35–60 (2005). 
 31. See C.K. ROWLAND & ROBERT A. CARP, POLITICS AND JUDGMENT IN FEDERAL 
DISTRICT COURTS 136 (1996) (“[T]he legal paradigm includes a set of implicit assumptions 
about the relationship between trial and appellate judges that is equally unable to accommodate 
evidence of political jurisprudence.”); see also id. at 136–51 (elaborating on the differences 
between trial and appellate courts). 
 32. More precisely, the hardship is “to the alien’s spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen 
of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence.” 8 U.S.C. § 
1229b(b)(1)(D) (2006). For an illustration of the imprecision of this standard when subjected to 
close analysis, see In re Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. 56, 58–63 (B.I.A. 2001). 
 33. David A. Martin, Reforming Asylum Adjudication: On Navigating the Coast of 
Bohemia, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1247, 1280–82 (1990). 
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are refugees.34 Under the law, winning refugee status requires 
individuals to show that they have suffered “persecution” or have a 
“well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, 
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political 
opinion.”35 
The “well-founded fear” language requires judges to take into 
account both past and potential future events.36 This task is not 
unique to immigration law. Judges face similar tasks when making 
sentencing decisions, especially when asked to take into account a 
defendant’s prospects for rehabilitation, and when awarding child 
custody. In each instance, they are required to apply broadly worded 
standards to factual situations that are often complicated and 
disputed. 
Arguably, however, asylum decisions are more difficult than 
sentencing and child custody decisions. Language problems, 
inexperience with the legal process, and pro se status37 frequently 
limit aliens’ ability to communicate their cases effectively to a court.38 
The facts of what happened in another country are often impossible 
to ascertain, and there may be little basis for predictions about what 
would happen if an individual were returned to that country.39 The 
usual absence of written evidence relevant to an asylum decision 
 
 34. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A). 
 35. Id. § 1101(a)(42)(A). 
 36. See, e.g., Ramirez-Felipe v. Mukasey, 292 F. App’x 482, 483–84 (6th Cir. 2008); 
Zulbeari v. INS, 963 F.2d 999, 1000–01 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 37. In fiscal year 2009, 39 percent of individuals with cases before immigration judges were 
represented by attorneys. EOIR, supra note 16, at G1 fig.9. On the lack of legal representation 
for most individuals and the difficulties it creates, see Nina Bernstein, In City of Lawyers, Many 
Immigrants Fight Deportation Alone, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2009, at A21. 
  Of course, individuals represented by attorneys do not necessarily receive high-quality 
services. See Aris v. Mukasey, 517 F.3d 595, 598–99, 601 (2d Cir. 2008) (describing how an 
attorney “failed spectacularly” in an immigration proceeding); Richard L. Abel, Practicing 
Immigration Law in Filene’s Basement, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1449, 1452–77 (2006) (describing an 
egregious example of neglect in the representation of Chinese immigrants); John T. Noonan, Jr., 
Immigration Law 2006, 55 CATH. U. L. REV. 905, 907–12 (2006) (referring to an attorney as a 
“scarecrow”). Both the high proportion of unrepresented individuals and the deficiencies of 
some representation are discussed in Robert A. Katzmann, The Legal Profession and the Unmet 
Needs of the Immigrant Poor, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 3, 5–10 (2008). The legal rules for 
adequacy of counsel in immigration proceedings have shifted in recent years. See In re 
Compean, 25 I. & N. Dec. 1 (Att’y Gen. 2009) (vacating several prior decisions instituting a new 
standard); John Schwartz, A Bush Rule Bolstering Deportations Is Withdrawn, N.Y. TIMES, June 
4, 2009, at A13 (describing a change from a Bush administration ruling). 
 38. See Alexander, supra note 2, at 18–19. 
 39. See Martin, supra note 33, at 1271–72, 1282–85. 
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makes judges especially dependent on their assessment of an alien’s 
testimony.40 
Two other characteristics add to the difficulty of removal 
decisions for judges. First, these decisions are dichotomous: 
adjudicators must “make a binary yes-or-no decision on a claim that 
could fall anywhere along a continuum.”41 Although a judge’s decision 
whether or not to sentence an individual to jail or prison time is also 
binary, that binary choice lies within a wide range of options.42 
Similarly, judges have a wide range of choices in child custody 
decisions because of the availability of joint custody and various 
options concerning visitation and other aspects of parental roles.43 
Second, there is particular finality to decisions about removal of 
individuals from the United States. In systems that allow for parole, a 
judge who sentences a defendant to prison knows that the length of 
the defendant’s stay depends in large part on someone else’s 
decisions. Child custody decisions are subject to reconsideration if 
one parent comes back to court with the claim that circumstances 
have changed. In contrast, there ordinarily is no opportunity to 
reconsider decisions whether to remove individuals from the United 
States. 
High levels of case difficulty can have multiple effects on 
decisionmaking. One effect is to foster inconsistency in a particular 
judge’s decisions.44 If legal standards and case facts are uncertain, a 
judge who seeks accuracy under the law may end up making 
idiosyncratic decisions due to the enormous leeway for choice that the 
law and facts allow. 
 
 40. Legomsky, supra note 24, at 443. 
 41. Margaret H. Taylor, Refugee Roulette in an Administrative Law Context: The Déjà Vu 
of Decisional Disparities in Agency Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 475, 489 (2007) (referring to 
asylum cases). In proceedings before an immigration judge, however, there is a third option of 
allowing an immigrant to leave the United States voluntarily. 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(b)(1) (2006). 
 42. If a judge sentences a defendant to prison, the judge can determine the length of the 
sentence within statutory constraints. If a judge does not impose a prison sentence, the judge 
can determine whether to impose probation, the length of the probation term, and the 
conditions of probation. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 5A–5C1.2 (2009). The 
Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), has (at least) 
weakened the force of the federal sentencing guidelines, but the options that the guidelines lay 
out are typical of those available to judges. 
 43. See AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS §§ 2.05–.12 (2002). 
 44. See, e.g., Leon Dash, Sentences Tied to “Gut Reaction,” WASH. POST, June 26, 1975, at 
D5 (describing the highly disparate sentences given to similar defendants on the basis of a 
judge’s “gut reaction” to them). 
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Another effect can be understood in terms of the social-
psychological theory of motivated reasoning.45 According to this 
theory, the more difficult it is to ascertain the accurate conclusion 
about a matter, the more that people’s preferences for one conclusion 
over another—directional goals, in contrast with accuracy goals—
come into play. Directional goals can influence judgments either 
consciously or unconsciously. The preferences that underlie 
directional goals for legal decisionmakers may be attitudes toward the 
policy issues that a case raises, often labeled “policy preferences,” or 
attitudes toward the litigants themselves. One result is increased 
variation among judges in their patterns of decisions, based on 
differences in attitudes. 
The effects of case difficulty on sentencing decisions are well 
documented. The adoption of sentencing guideline systems was 
largely a response to evidence of bias46 and idiosyncrasy47 in individual 
judges’ choices, as well as disparities in sentencing patterns among 
judges.48 But guideline systems did not eliminate these problems.49 In 
 
 45. See Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOL. BULL. 480, 480 
(1990) (discussing how motivation affects reasoning through “reliance on a biased set of 
cognitive processes”). See generally Roy F. Baumeister & Leonard S. Newman, Self-Regulation 
of Cognitive Inference and Decision Processes, 20 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 3 
(1994) (discussing “motivated cognition in the context of self-regulation theory”); Tom 
Pyszczynski & Jeff Greenberg, Toward an Integration of Cognitive and Motivational 
Perspectives on Social Inference: A Biased Hypothesis-Testing Model, 20 ADVANCES 
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 297 (1987) (analyzing cognitive and motivational bases for 
biased cognitions); Carolin Showers & Nancy Cantor, Social Cognition: A Look at Motivated 
Strategies, 36 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 275 (1985) (analyzing the role of motivation in social 
cognition). For a discussion of the application of the motivated reasoning concept to judicial 
decisionmaking, see EILEEN BRAMAN, LAW, POLITICS, AND PERCEPTION: HOW POLICY 
PREFERENCES INFLUENCE LEGAL REASONING 13–79 (2009). 
 46. The evidence on racial discrimination in sentencing is complex and disputed. See 
Steven Klepper, Daniel Nagin & Luke-Jon Tierney, Discrimination in the Criminal Justice 
System—A Critical Appraisal of the Literature, in 2 RESEARCH ON SENTENCING: THE SEARCH 
FOR REFORM 55, 55–128 (Alfred Blumstein et al. eds., 1983) (critiquing studies of 
discrimination in case disposition); Martha A. Myers & Susette M. Talarico, The Social Contexts 
of Racial Discrimination in Sentencing, 33 SOC. PROBS. 236, 236 (1986) (analyzing “whether race 
differences in treatment vary as a function of who is being sentenced and where sentencing 
occurs”). 
 47. MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 12–25 (1972); 
see also JAMES S. KUNEN, “HOW CAN YOU DEFEND THOSE PEOPLE?”: THE MAKING OF A 
CRIMINAL LAWYER 37 (1983) (reporting a judge’s description of the impact of time of day and 
day of week on sentencing). 
 48. See generally Shari Seidman Diamond & Hans Zeisel, Sentencing Councils: A Study of 
Sentencing Disparity and Its Reduction, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 109 (1975) (studying sentencing 
disparity and discussing early attempts to study the phenomenon). 
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light of the great uncertainty involved in applying vague standards to 
the facts of individual cases, such problems are inevitable. Although 
there is not as much systematic information available on judges’ child 
custody decisions as there is on sentencing decisions, the looseness of 
the “best interests of the child” standard and the frequency of 
disputed facts seem to produce similar patterns.50 
Whether or not immigration cases present greater difficulties 
than sentencing and child custody cases, their difficulty affects 
decisionmaking. The theory of motivated reasoning suggests that this 
difficulty increases the weight of judges’ preferences. This suggestion 
is consistent with the striking disparity among immigration judges in 
their patterns of decisions in asylum cases.51 It is not surprising that 
there is a relationship between rates of granting asylum and two 
characteristics of immigration judges that are probably correlated 
with their policy preferences: gender52 and experience in enforcement 
of immigration laws.53 The difficulty of deciding immigration cases can 
shape immigration judges’ choices in other ways as well, expanding 
the room for bias and idiosyncrasy. 
Because the BIA and courts of appeals address cases under 
different rules from those that apply to immigration courts, judges in 
these two forums do not necessarily face the same level of case 
difficulty as immigration judges. In immigration cases, the tasks of the 
BIA and the courts of appeals differ from those of immigration courts 
because they review preexisting decisions and their review is 
circumscribed.54 The BIA is not to “engage in de novo review of 
 
 49. See Shawn D. Bushway & Anne Morrison Piehl, Judging Judicial Discretion: Legal 
Factors and Racial Discrimination in Sentencing, 35 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 733, 748–62 (2001); 
Darrell Steffensmeier, Jeffery Ulmer & John Kramer, The Interaction of Race, Gender, and Age 
in Criminal Sentencing: The Punishment Cost of Being Young, Black, and Male, 36 
CRIMINOLOGY 763, 785 n.8 (1998); Jeffery T. Ulmer & John H. Kramer, Court Communities 
Under Sentencing Guidelines: Dilemmas of Formal Rationality and Sentencing Disparity, 34 
CRIMINOLOGY 383, 389 (1996). 
 50. See Robert H. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of 
Indeterminacy, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226, 249–62 (1975). 
 51. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, NO. GAO-08-940, SIGNIFICANT 
VARIATION EXISTED IN ASYLUM OUTCOMES ACROSS IMMIGRATION COURTS AND JUDGES 
22–29 (2008); TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE, LATEST DATA FROM 
IMMIGRATION COURTS SHOW DECLINE IN ASYLUM DISPARITY (2009), http://trac.syr.edu/ 
immigration/reports/209/; Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 3, at 325–49. 
 52. Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 3, at 342–46. 
 53. Id. at 347–49. 
 54. For a discussion of circumscribed immigration review in the courts of appeals, see 
Katzmann, supra note 37, at 7. 
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findings of fact determined by an immigration judge.”55 It may review 
those facts “only to determine whether the findings of the 
immigration judge are clearly erroneous,”56 although it can review 
other issues de novo.57 Courts of appeals ruling on petitions for review 
of BIA decisions must decide “only on the administrative record.”58 
“[T]he administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any 
reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the 
contrary,”59 and “a decision that an alien is not eligible for admission 
to the United States is conclusive unless manifestly contrary to law.”60 
These limits reduce the difficulty of judges’ tasks as 
decisionmakers in some respects, and that is especially true of the 
courts of appeals. The language of the governing rules for review, 
however, still requires judges to make difficult judgments about the 
facts in some cases. The Second Circuit, for instance, regularly 
wrestles with the credibility of applicants as witnesses on issues 
relating to asylum.61 
In part because of the high stakes involved, immigration cases 
can be difficult at all levels of the system. The task of immigration 
judges in at least a substantial proportion of cases is unusually 
difficult. The limited scope of decisionmaking in the BIA and (even 
more) the courts of appeals eases the difficulty of decisionmaking in 
some ways. In the field of immigration, however, the courts of appeals 
hear primarily asylum cases, and these cases present decisionmakers 
at any level with special challenges. 
B. Time Pressures 
With relatively few cases to decide on the merits, and with a staff 
of four well-qualified law clerks, Supreme Court Justices may not feel 
heavy time pressures in their work as decisionmakers. If so, they are 
unusual. Most judges have to cope with more cases than they can 
 
 55. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i) (2009). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. § 1003.1(d)(3)(ii). 
 58. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(A) (2006). 
 59. Id. § 1252(b)(4)(B). 
 60. Id. § 1252(b)(4)(C). 
 61. See John R.B. Palmer, The Second Circuit’s “New Asylum Seekers”: Responses to an 
Expanded Immigration Docket, 55 CATH. U. L. REV. 965, 977–97, 982–88 (2006). 
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handle comfortably in the time available.62 The greater the time 
pressures that they feel, the more likely that these pressures will 
affect the quality of decisionmaking. 
Students of judicial behavior have not given sufficient weight to 
the existence of time pressures in most courts. As federal court of 
appeals Judge Frank Easterbrook put it, “[m]uch of the judge-
centered scholarship in contemporary law schools assumes that judges 
have the leisure to examine subjects deeply and resolve debates 
wisely. Professors believe they have this capacity and attribute it to 
judges. Pfah!”63 Judge Easterbrook might have directed his comment 
at political scientists as well, because they too often operate under the 
implicit assumption that judges can analyze carefully each case that 
they are called upon to decide. 
Immigration judges face extraordinarily severe caseload 
pressures. With a large volume of cases to resolve, they need to 
decide cases quickly, and they receive considerable pressure from 
their superiors to do so.64 In the period from 2000 to 2005, the total 
immigration caseload grew substantially with little increase in the 
number of immigration judges.65 In 2005, according to one calculation, 
immigration judges averaged “more than six cases per judge per 
workday.”66 The total caseload in 2009, measured by the number of 
proceedings received by the immigration courts, was about the same 
as it was in 2005.67 Judges have little staff support; even with an 
increase in the number of law clerks, there is still an average of only 
one clerk for every four judges.68 Immigration judges and others have 
attested to the difficulties created by this workload, and some have 
used an analogy to traffic court to highlight the need for speed in 
 
 62. Of course, judges themselves help determine how much time is available. For a 
discussion of the judicial preference for leisure, see RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 
123–26 (1995). 
 63. Frank H. Easterbrook, What’s So Special About Judges?, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 773, 778 
(1990). 
 64. See Stuart L. Lustig et al., Inside the Judges’ Chambers: Narrative Responses from the 
National Association of Immigration Judges Stress and Burnout Survey, 23 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 
57, 64–65 (2008) (quoting immigration judges on pressures to complete cases). 
 65. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 51, at 11–14. 
 66. Alexander, supra note 2, at 19. 
 67. See EOIR, supra note 16, at C3 tbl.3 (noting a 1.1 percent caseload decline between 
2005 and 2009). 
 68. Stephen H. Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, 59 DUKE L.J. 1635, 
1652 (2010). 
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decisionmaking despite the gravity of the cases before immigration 
courts.69 
A president of the National Association of Immigration Law 
Judges reported in 2005 that in an earlier period immigration judges 
had been “encouraged to do things in a short-and-dirty manner,” 
because the BIA was a backstop to catch errors.70 But when BIA 
procedures were changed so that large proportions of cases were 
decided summarily by a single judge rather than receiving more 
extensive consideration by a three-judge panel, that backstop was no 
longer available.71 A perceived need to analyze cases more carefully, 
however, does not mean that judges actually can engage in that 
careful analysis. As one court of appeals judge said, “I fail to see how 
Immigration Judges can be expected to make thorough and 
competent findings of fact and conclusions of law under these 
circumstances.”72 
Members of the BIA are also under heavy caseload pressures. In 
the 1990s, a combination of forces brought about an enormous 
increase in the number of cases appealed to the BIA, creating a 
substantial backlog.73 Streamlining rules adopted in 199974 and 
 
 69. According to one immigration judge, “[t]hese are death penalty cases being handled 
with the resources of traffic court.” APPLESEED, ASSEMBLY LINE INJUSTICE: BLUEPRINT TO 
REFORM AMERICA’S IMMIGRATION COURTS 1 (2009), available at http://www.appleseeds.net/ 
Portals/0/Documents/Publications/Assembly%20Line%20Injustice.pdf; see also Juan P. Osuna, 
Chairman, BIA, Panel Discussion at the Brookings Institution: Immigration and the Courts 12 
(Feb. 20, 2009) (transcript available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/events/2009/ 
0220_immigration/20080220_immigration.pdf) (noting that a former chief immigration judge 
called the immigration court system “a traffic court volume with Supreme Court 
consequences”). 
 70. Solomon Moore & Ann M. Simmons, Immigrant Pleas Crushing Federal Appellate 
Courts, L.A. TIMES, May 2, 2005, at A1. 
 71. Id; see also Immigration Litigation Reduction, supra note 10, at 187 (statement of John 
M. Walker, Jr., C.J., U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit); Benedetto, supra note 14, at 
477–80 (noting that BIA reform precludes the BIA from “cleaning up” the improper decisions 
of immigration judges). The proportion of summary BIA decisions was later reduced. See infra 
note 78. 
 72. Immigration Litigation Reduction, supra note 10, at 186–87 (statement of John M. 
Walker, Jr.). Chief Judge Walker also said at the hearing that “[w]e don’t have confidence, 
frankly, that the BIA has really looked at the case.” Id. at 22 (testimony of John M. Walker, Jr.). 
 73. DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP, STUDY CONDUCTED FOR THE AMERICAN BAR 
ASSOCIATION COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION POLICY, PRACTICE AND PRO BONO RE: BOARD 
OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS: PROCEDURAL REFORMS TO IMPROVE CASE MANAGEMENT 12–16 
(2003), available at http://www.dorsey.com/files/upload/DorseyStudyABA_8mgPDF.pdf. 
 74. Board of Immigration Appeals: Streamlining, 64 Fed. Reg. 56,135. 56,135 (Oct. 18, 
1999) (codified as amended at 8 C.F.R. pt. 1003). 
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procedural reforms adopted in 200275 were designed to cope with the 
backlog. The 1999 rules allowed single BIA members to hear certain 
cases in place of three-judge panels. These rules also allowed for 
affirmance without opinion of certain kinds of decisions by 
immigration judges.76 The 2002 rules made single-member decisions 
the general rule,77 expanded the use of affirmances without opinion,78 
and substituted a clearly erroneous standard of review of factual 
judgments in the place of de novo review.79 Even with these 
expedients, the work of BIA members remains daunting. According 
to one calculation, they averaged “more than sixteen appeals per 
member per workday” in 2006.80 
Judges on the federal courts of appeals face their own caseload 
pressures, but these pressures are not nearly as severe as they are for 
administrative decisionmakers in immigration law. The courts of 
appeals, however, have had to confront rapid growth in the numbers 
of petitions for review of BIA decisions. This rapid growth reflects 
primarily a higher rate of petitions from BIA decisions and 
secondarily an increase in the volume of those decisions.81 The growth 
 
 75. Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms to Improve Case Management, 67 
Fed. Reg. 54,878, 54,878 (Aug. 26, 2002) (codified as amended at 8 C.F.R. pt. 1003). 
 76. Board of Immigration Appeals: Streamlining, 64 Fed. Reg. at 56,141–42. 
 77. In each of the fiscal years from 2003 through 2008, the percentage of BIA cases decided 
by single members was between 93 percent and 94 percent. Legomsky, supra note 68, at 1657 
n.104. 
 78. The expansion was enormous, but it has since been reversed. Of the BIA decisions in 
fiscal year 2001, 6 percent were affirmances without opinion. Id. at 1662. In fiscal years 2002 
through 2004, about one-third were affirmances without opinion. See id. In fiscal year 2009, the 
proportion was 5 percent. Id. Attorney General Alberto Gonzales indicated in 2007 that the 
BIA would be “drastically decreasing its reliance on summary one-line decisions.” Oversight of 
the U.S. Department of Justice: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 
(2007) (statement of Alberto Gonzales, Att’y Gen. of the United States). As yet, there appear 
to be no analyses indicating whether the decline in the use of affirmances without opinion has 
been accompanied by an increase in decisions favorable to individuals. 
 79. Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms to Improve Case Management, 67 
Fed. Reg. at 54,902–03. 
 80. Alexander, supra note 2, at 21. 
 81. STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M. RODRÍGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE 
LAW AND POLICY 758 (5th ed. 2009) (“In 2002, just before the BIA reforms, only 5% of the 
BIA decisions were being appealed to the federal courts. By November 2004 that figure was 
25% and by 2006 it had risen to 30%.” (citation omitted)); Palmer, supra note 5, at 15 
(“Observers generally agree that the surge is closely linked to recent procedural changes at the 
BIA, which substantially increased the volume of decisions reached by that tribunal, and led 
litigants to appeal those decisions at a higher rate.”); Palmer et al., supra note 6, at 3 (“More 
people than ever before are petitioning the courts to review decisions of the Board of 
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has been most substantial for the Ninth Circuit, which receives the 
largest number of petitions to review BIA decisions, and the Second 
Circuit, for which those petitions constitute a larger share of the 
caseload than in any other circuit.82 In fiscal year 2008, 41 percent of 
new Second Circuit cases and 34 percent of new Ninth Circuit cases 
were petitions to review BIA decisions.83 The biggest surge came in 
2002, as a result of changes in BIA procedures that increased both the 
number of BIA decisions and the propensity of individuals to petition 
for review of those decisions. The number of petitions to the Second 
Circuit increased by 781 percent between February 2002 and 
February 2003.84 
The most fundamental impact of heavy caseloads is to put judges 
in a position in which they have to balance their goal of making the 
best possible decision—whatever their criteria for “best” may be—
against the goal of simply getting through the cases. Judges cannot 
take all of the time needed to fully consider the alternatives in a 
case.85 And when caseload pressures are greatest, simply processing 
cases may become the dominant goal in decisionmaking. Although 
judges can reduce their burdens by delegating work to other people,86 
such expedients are often inadequate or unavailable. 
Judges, then, must adopt cognitive strategies that speed up the 
process of decisionmaking. One strategy available to them is the 
adoption of heuristics, such as formal or informal presumptions, to 
guide decisions.87 An appellate court, for instance, might establish a 
 
Immigration Appeals (BIA), and these petitions now account for a substantial proportion of the 
caseload in the courts of appeals . . . .”). 
 82. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 11, at tbl.B-3. 
 83. Id. In fiscal year 2009, the proportions were considerably lower—28 percent in the 
Second Circuit and 27 percent in the Ninth Circuit. Id. It is uncertain whether the decline in 
2009 and the overall decline in petitions to review BIA decisions represent the beginning of a 
longer-term trend. If so, the perceived need to relieve the courts of appeals of their immigration 
caseloads may weaken. 
 84. Comm. on Fed. Courts, The Surge of Immigration Appeals and Its Impact on the Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals, 60 REC. ASS’N B. CITY N.Y. 243, 244 (2005). 
 85. See Dan Simon, A Psychological Model of Judicial Decision Making, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 
1, 82 (1998) (“[G]iven the work load of judges, they often make their decisions before 
developing the models to their fullest.”). 
 86. One example is the central staff that does much of the work of reaching decisions in a 
subset of cases in some appellate courts. See JOY A. CHAPPER & ROGER A. HANSON, NAT’L 
CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURTS: IMPROVING CASE 
PROCESSING 15–22 (1990). 
 87. For background on the use of heuristics in decisionmaking, see generally JUDGMENT 
UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos 
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heavy presumption in favor of affirmance that appellants cannot 
easily overcome.88 And directional goals may take precedence over 
accuracy goals,89 because less time generally is required to ascertain 
how a case relates to one’s preferences than to closely analyze its 
legal merits. In this respect, time pressures could reinforce the effects 
of case difficulty. 
For immigration judges, caseload pressures contribute to the 
high levels of stress reported by judges.90 These pressures might also 
help account for some immigration judges’ abusive treatment of 
asylum applicants.91 The wide disparities in the rates at which 
immigration judges rule in favor of asylum claims may be a product of 
these pressures as well as the difficulty of ascertaining the right 
answer in these cases. With little time to decide difficult cases, judges 
may respond largely in terms of their general attitudes toward asylum 
and asylum claimants. 
In contrast to immigration judges, members of the BIA have 
incentives to rule in a particular way to reduce the pressures on 
themselves. Specifically, they can summarily affirm rulings of 
immigration courts against individuals without writing an opinion, 
whereas reversals require opinions.92 The 2002 rule changes that 
expanded the circumstances under which summary affirmances could 
be used and that encouraged their use93 help account for the decline in 
the proportion of decisions by immigration judges that BIA members 
reverse.94 
 
Tversky eds., 1982); RICHARD NISBETT & LEE ROSS, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND 
SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT 17–42 (1980). 
 88. Thomas Y. Davies, Affirmed: A Study of Criminal Appeals and Decision-Making 
Norms in a California Court of Appeal, 1982 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 543, 602–03. 
 89. On the meaning of directional and accuracy goals, see supra text accompanying note 
45. 
 90. Lustig et al., supra note 64, at 59; Marcia Coyle, Burnout, Stress Plague Immigration 
Judges, NAT’L L.J., July 13, 2009, at 4. 
 91. See, e.g., Ba v. Gonzales, 228 F. App’x 7, 11 (2d Cir. 2007); Nina Bernstein, Judge Who 
Chastised Weeping Asylum Seeker Is Taken off Case, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2007, at B1. 
 92. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4) (2009). 
 93. See Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms to Improve Case 
Management, 67 Fed. Reg. 54,878, 54,885–87 (Aug. 26, 2002) (codified as amended at 8 C.F.R. 
pt. 1003). 
 94. For a depiction of the increased use of summary decisions and the increased proportion 
of denied appeals, see DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP, supra note 73, at apps. 24–25. For a discussion 
of affirmances without opinion, see supra note 78. It is uncertain whether the decline in the use 
of summary decisions since 2004 has been accompanied by a reduced proportion of denied 
appeals. 
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For court of appeals judges, there is some evidence about the 
effects of growing immigration caseloads. One analysis found that the 
impact of judges’ ideological positions on their decisions on petitions 
for review of BIA decisions was far greater from 2003 to 2008, after 
the big increase in the number of petitions, than it had been from 
1998 to 2002.95 The study’s author suggested that increased time 
pressures may have led judges to fall back on their policy preferences 
as relatively efficient guides to decision.96 
The outlier among the circuits in decisions made from 2004 to 
2005 was the Seventh Circuit, in which the remand rate (that is, 
nonaffirmances) was 36 percent, about twice as high as the circuits 
that ranked second and third (19.5 percent in the Ninth Circuit, 17 
percent in the Second Circuit).97 In a 2005 opinion, Judge Richard 
Posner called attention to the Seventh Circuit’s high reversal rate in 
immigration cases.98 Four years later, he speculated that caseloads had 
something to do with that high rate: “The 7th Circuit doesn’t have 
one of the heaviest workloads. Maybe that’s why we reverse so many 
of the appeals.”99 Yet some other circuits with relatively small 
absolute numbers of immigration petitions and small proportions of 
immigration petitions among their cases had low reversal rates.100 
As the 2002 rule changes for the BIA indicate, courts (or those 
who make rules for courts) can cope with caseload pressures by 
adopting procedural changes that skew decisions in one direction. 
The Second Circuit, which is subject to the greatest caseload 
pressures in immigration, has adopted procedural changes that ease 
these pressures but that may not affect the court’s decisional 
 
 95. Chad Westerland, The Consequences of Immigration Reform for the U.S. Courts of 
Appeals 38 (Aug. 3, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/ abstract= 
1443381. 
 96. Id. at 28–29. 
 97. Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 3, at 362 tbl.2. The overall remand rate for all circuits 
was 15.4 percent. Id. In 2006, a DOJ official reported (for an unspecified period) that 
individuals won in 14 percent of the decisions by courts of appeals; if procedural decisions were 
taken into account, the success rate was less than 10 percent. Immigration Litigation Reduction, 
supra note 10, at 33 (testimony of Jonathan Cohn, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Civil Division, 
U.S. Department of Justice). 
 98. Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 829 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 99. Abdon M. Pallasch, Political Refugees Better Off Right Here, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Apr. 27, 
2009, at 14 (quoting Richard Posner, J., U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit). 
 100. Total numbers of appeals for 2004–05 were obtained from the OFFICE OF PUBLIC 
AFFAIRS, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2005 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR: 
JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 101 tbl.B (2006), available at http://www. 
uscourts.gov/judbus2005/appendices/b0.pdf. 
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tendencies.101 The Ninth Circuit engages in heavy screening of 
immigration cases. One member of the court reported in 2006 that 
only 9 percent of the immigration cases terminated in 2005 “actually 
reached three-judge panels,”102 and another reported that “well over 
80% of the immigration petitions for review are resolved through 
centralized staff review.”103 It is uncertain to what extent, if at all, this 
screening affects the aggregate outcomes of cases. 
Caseload pressures are a key attribute of adjudication in the field 
of immigration. The Second and Ninth Circuits have adapted to those 
pressures through procedural changes, and major procedural changes 
were mandated for the BIA. For immigration judges, who hear cases 
in the first instance, summary review of prior decisions is unavailable. 
Large caseloads, reinforced by the difficulty of deciding cases, create 
enormous time pressures in the immigration courts. 
C. Control 
Judicial independence and accountability are longstanding 
concerns for scholars, public policymakers, and judges themselves.104 
The relationship between the federal courts and the larger political 
system has been a matter of particular interest. This interest has 
grown in recent years due to a perceived increase in attacks on the 
courts from the other branches.105 
 
 101. Comm. on Fed. Courts, supra note 84, at 249–52; Palmer, supra note 61, at 971–76; 
Osuna, supra note 69, at 51–56. 
 102. Immigration Litigation Reduction, supra note 10, at 9 (testimony of Carlos T. Bea, J., 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit). 
 103. Id. at 182 (letter from Sidney R. Thomas, J., U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit). 
 104. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Barry Friedman & Deborah Goldberg, Introduction to 
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE CROSSROADS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 3 
(Stephen B. Burbank & Barry Friedman eds., 2002). Independence and accountability usually 
refer to the content of judges’ decisions, and I follow that usage in this and subsequent 
discussions of control over judges. This kind of control should be distinguished from control 
over the quantity of decisions—that is, efforts to increase production by judges to deal with case 
backlogs. Efforts by superiors to increase production in the immigration courts and the BIA 
were discussed previously. See supra Part I.C. 
 105. See, e.g., BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS 
INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 
(2009); CHARLES GARDNER GEYH, WHEN COURTS & CONGRESS COLLIDE: THE STRUGGLE 
FOR CONTROL OF AMERICA’S JUDICIAL SYSTEM (2006); MARK C. MILLER, THE VIEW OF THE 
COURTS FROM THE HILL: INTERACTIONS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 
(2009). 
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Such attacks notwithstanding, judges on the federal courts of 
appeals enjoy considerable freedom from their political environment. 
Because of their intermediate position in the judicial hierarchy, their 
decisions lack the visibility of Supreme Court decisions, and it is 
relatively rare for court of appeals decisions to arouse political 
controversy.106 Of course, court of appeals judges are insulated by life 
tenure. 
The most significant source of control over the courts of appeals 
is Supreme Court review. If judges seek to avoid reversal, either for 
practical or symbolic reasons, the prospect of review may affect the 
choices of circuit court judges.107 But the infrequency with which the 
Supreme Court reviews court of appeals decisions works against 
hierarchical control. As noted earlier,108 the Court hears relatively few 
immigration cases. 
Court of appeals judges also are subject to a degree of 
congressional control, in that Congress could respond negatively to 
decisions with which its members disagree. Indeed, Congress has 
acted to remove the jurisdiction of the courts of appeals over certain 
immigration matters.109 Taken together, these congressional actions 
are quite consequential, eliminating judicial review of most issues 
relating to removal, other than asylum claims.110 These actions may 
 
 106. Perhaps the most controversial court of appeals decision in recent years was the Ninth 
Circuit decision holding that inclusion of “under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance recited at a 
public school was unconstitutional. Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 328 F.3d 466, 488 (9th Cir. 2002), 
rev’d sub nom. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004). The level of interest 
in that decision highlighted the infrequency with which court of appeals decisions receive much 
attention. See, e.g., Alexander K. Hooper, Recent Development, Jurisdiction-Stripping: The 
Pledge Protection Act of 2004, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 511, 511 & n.3 (2005) (discussing public 
and congressional reaction to the Ninth Circuit decision and the introduction in the House of 
Representatives of a jurisdiction-stripping bill intended to “protect” the Pledge of Allegiance). 
 107. See Donald R. Songer, Jeffrey A. Segal & Charles M. Cameron, The Hierarchy of 
Justice: Testing a Principal-Agent Model of Supreme Court-Circuit Court Interactions, 38 AM. J. 
POL. SCI. 673, 673–74 (1994). 
 108. See supra note 12. 
 109. Dobkin, supra note 26, at 104–07; Legomsky, supra note 4, at 380–84. The statutes that 
limited jurisdiction were the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. 
No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified in scattered sections of 8, 18, 22, 28, 40, and 42 U.S.C.), the 
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. 
C, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.), and the REAL 
ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 302 (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). 
 110. Provisions of the 1996 statutes “bar judicial review of entire classes of removal orders, 
preclude judicial review of most discretionary decisions, specifically prohibit the use of 
particular judicial remedies and forms of action, and otherwise inhibit judicial review.” 
Legomsky, supra note 4, at 380. 
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have resulted in part from dissatisfaction with the courts’ perceived 
decisional tendencies in such matters. 
Whatever may be the extent of external control over Article III 
federal judges such as those on the courts of appeals, judges who 
work within the executive branch are generally thought to have 
considerably less independence.111 Administrative law judges (ALJs) 
have the highest degree of independence, but that independence is 
still limited. The most important limit is the power of agency heads to 
review ALJ decisions.112 The battles between the Social Security 
Administration and its ALJs in the 1980s indicate that ALJs have 
some ability to fight off efforts at control; however, these battles also 
underline the extent of control that does exist.113 
Immigration judges and members of the BIA are not ALJs, and 
their independence is more limited.114 Serving in the EOIR in the 
DOJ,115 both sets of judges are thereby free from control by the DHS, 
which is the government litigant in administrative cases. But the DOJ 
is an interested party in litigation issues. Among other things, it 
houses the Office of Immigration Litigation, whose attorneys 
represent the DHS in immigration cases in federal court.116 DOJ 
officials can and have used their powers to influence or preempt the 
decisions of immigration judges, and they have asserted broad powers 
 
 111. See, e.g., James E. Moliterno, The Administrative Judiciary’s Independence Myth, 41 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1191, 1209–34 (2006). 
 112. For background on this review and its exercise, see generally Christina L. Boyd & 
Amanda Driscoll, Empirical Insights into Agency Adjudications: Agency Head Reversals of 
Administrative Law Judges (Aug. 18, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, presented at the 2008 
Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, on file with the Duke Law 
Journal); Cole Taratoot, Accountability and Independence: Administrative Law Judges and 
NLRB Rulings (July 1, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
1428518. 
 113. See DONNA PRICE COFER, JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND THE QUESTION OF 
INDEPENDENCE: A STUDY OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION HEARING PROCESS 
75–156 (1985); Taylor, supra note 41, at 177–82; Paul R. Verkuil, Reflections upon the Federal 
Administrative Judiciary, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1341, 1354–55 (1992). 
 114. Legomsky, supra note 4, at 372–79. For background on executive-branch adjudicators 
who are not ALJs, see generally John H. Frye III, Survey of Non-ALJ Hearing Programs in the 
Federal Government, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 261 (1992). 
 115. EOIR, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, EOIR Background Information, http://www.justice.gov/ 
eoir/background.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2010). 
 116. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Immigration Litigation: District Court Section, 
http://www.justice.gov/civil/oil/District_Court_Section.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2010); see also 
Margaret H. Taylor, Behind the Scenes of St. Cyr and Zadvydas: Making Policy in the Midst of 
Litigation, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 271, 293 & n.122 (2002) (noting that the DOJ’s Office of 
Immigration Litigation handles immigration cases). 
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to relieve immigration judges of their assignments.117 Because the BIA 
was created by the DOJ and has no statutory basis,118 it is subject to 
even greater control by DOJ officials. 
Attorney General John Ashcroft’s actions in 2002 and 2003 
demonstrated the DOJ’s capacity to control the BIA.119 The BIA 
procedural changes discussed earlier120 represented efforts to address 
the backlog of cases, but they also created incentives to rule against 
individuals who appealed from decisions by immigration judges. 
More importantly, Ashcroft announced that the number of positions 
on the BIA would be reduced from twenty-three to eleven,121 a 
decision that was striking in light of the backlog. Because of 
vacancies, only five BIA members were reassigned to other positions 
in 2003 to reach the goal of a membership of eleven.122 Based on these 
members’ decisional tendencies, it appears that they were reassigned 
largely due to their tendency to favor appellants more than their 
colleagues did.123 
The existence of significant controls over judges might affect 
their behavior in multiple ways. Broadly speaking, if these controls do 
affect judges’ choices, the effects could take two forms. First, judges 
 
 117. Legomsky, supra note 4, at 372–75. Provisions of a 2007 Code of Conduct for 
immigration judges and members of the BIA exempted communications with DOJ employees 
from the prohibition on ex parte communications while a case was pending. Codes of Conduct 
for the Immigration Judges and Board Members, 72 Fed. Reg. 35,510, 35,511–12 (June 28, 
2007). In the view of one commentator, each of these provisions “further erodes . . . decisional 
independence.” Legomsky, supra note 24, at 420–21. Another change adopted under Attorney 
General Gonzales allowed government attorneys, but not those representing the other side, to 
file complaints about decisions by immigration judges and the BIA. Executive Office for 
Immigration Review: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, 
Border Security, and International Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 40 (2009) 
(testimony of Stephen H. Legomsky, Professor, Washington University School of Law). 
 118. See Regulations Governing Departmental Organization and Authority, 5 Fed. Reg. 
3502, 3503 (Sept. 4, 1940) (codified as amended at 8 C.F.R. pt. 1003) (establishing the BIA); see 
also Legomsky, supra note 24, at 417 (noting that the BIA was created by the attorney general 
rather than by statute). 
 119. See Legomsky, supra note 4, at 375–77 (describing the structural and procedural 
changes in the BIA instituted by Attorney General Ashcroft, and their influence on BIA 
decisions). 
 120. See supra text accompanying note 93. 
 121. Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms to Improve Case Management, 67 
Fed. Reg. 54,878, 54,893 (Aug. 26, 2002) (codified as amended at 8 C.F.R. pt. 1003). 
 122. Peter J. Levinson, The Facade of Quasi-Judicial Independence in Immigration Appellate 
Adjudications, 9 BENDER’S IMMIGR. BULL. 1154, 1155 (2004). 
 123. See id. at 1156–61 (analyzing BIA members’ votes in closely divided en banc decisions 
and concluding that those who tended to favor noncitizens were more likely than their 
colleagues to be reassigned). 
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might respond selectively, avoiding specific decisions that could 
arouse negative reactions from those who hold controls over them. 
Alternatively, judges might adjust their decisions regularly, moving 
policy in the direction preferred by those with control. 
This dichotomy is illustrated by the relationship between the 
Supreme Court and Congress.124 The powers of Congress to override 
or limit the effects of the Court’s decisions and congressional powers 
over the Court as an institution arguably give the Justices reason to 
take Congress into account in their decisionmaking. One possible 
result is that the Justices generally act without regard to Congress, but 
draw back from decisions that seem likely to produce deep and 
widespread dismay among members of Congress. Another possible 
result is that the Justices routinely adjust their decisions so that the 
ideological content of those decisions does not diverge too far from 
the collective view of Congress.125 
In all likelihood, Supreme Court review and congressional power 
over jurisdiction have little effect on the decisions of the courts of 
appeals in immigration law. It is not clear that concern about 
potential reversal has a great deal of impact on court of appeals 
judges in general,126 and the infrequency of Supreme Court review of 
immigration law decisions further limits the likely impact of that 
review. Judges might avoid decisions that run counter to the 
perceived preferences of Congress, especially decisions that expand 
the rights of noncitizens under the immigration laws. But there are so 
many immigration cases and so many circuit court judges that a judge 
who must decide a specific case has little reason to think that the 
decision in that case will have much impact on the prospect of 
congressional action.127 
 
 124. See BAUM, supra note 27, at 73–81 (assessing these two models’ power to explain 
Supreme Court behavior). 
 125. For arguments that the Justices respond to Congress in this way in statutory cases, see 
generally Mario Bergara, Barak Richman & Pablo T. Spiller, Modeling Supreme Court Strategic 
Decision Making: The Congressional Constraint, 28 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 247 (2003); William N. 
Eskridge, Jr., Reneging on History? Playing the Court/Congress/President Civil Rights Game, 79 
CAL. L. REV. 613 (1991). For a skeptical view of this argument, see Jeffrey A. Segal, Separation-
of-Powers Games in the Positive Theory of Law and Courts, 91 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 28 (1997). 
 126. David E. Klein & Robert J. Hume, Fear of Reversal as an Explanation of Lower Court 
Compliance, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 579, 580 (2003). 
 127. In other words, even if judges would prefer that Congress not limit their jurisdiction in 
immigration cases or change the law to limit immigrants’ legal rights, they face a collective 
action problem: because a single judge’s choices seldom have much effect on the likelihood that 
Congress will take negative action, judges have little incentive to take positions that depart from 
their reading of the law or their policy preferences to avoid displeasing Congress. For 
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The record of the courts of appeals in asylum cases strongly 
suggests that court of appeals judges feel free to follow their own 
paths in immigration law. The substantial proportion of decisions in 
which panels remand BIA decisions and the substantial variation in 
that proportion across circuits128 provide evidence that judges respond 
to asylum cases primarily on the basis of their own legal and policy 
considerations rather than external control. 
Because immigration judges and members of the BIA lack the 
job security of Article III judges, it is far more plausible that 
hierarchical controls affect their behavior. Within the judiciary, it is 
widely assumed that life tenure or its absence has considerable effect 
on judges’ independence. The empirical evidence on this effect for 
Article I and Article III judges is quite limited, but it suggests that 
Article I judges are more responsive to the preferences of the other 
branches.129 There is more substantial evidence to show that the need 
to win a new term from the electorate affects the choices of state 
judges.130 For their part, state judges whose continued tenure depends 
on the governor or state legislature may be inclined to favor state 
 
background on collective action problems, see generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF 
COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1971). 
  In light of the difficulty of many immigration cases and the growth in the volume of 
these cases despite congressional action, it is not certain that all judges are unhappy about 
limitations on their jurisdiction in the immigration field. 
 128. See Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 3, at 362 tbl.2 (showing the percentage of asylum 
cases remanded by each circuit in 2004 and 2005). 
 129. See, e.g., Scott Andrew Hendrickson, Examining Judicial Independence: Article I v. 
Article III Courts 94–192 (Aug. 2006) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Washington University 
in St. Louis) (on file with Olin Library, Washington University in St. Louis) (studying tax and 
international trade litigation in federal courts). 
 130. See Sanford C. Gordon & Gregory A. Huber, The Effect of Electoral Competitiveness 
on Incumbent Behavior, 2 Q.J. POL. SCI. 107, 108 (2007) (“[J]udges in partisan competitive 
systems sentence significantly more punitively than those in retention systems.”); Melinda Gann 
Hall, Constituent Influence in State Supreme Courts: Conceptual Notes and a Case Study, 49 J. 
POL. 1117, 1122–23 (1987) (finding that electoral pressures made a Louisiana Supreme Court 
justice less likely to cast unpopular votes in highly visible death penalty cases); Melinda Gann 
Hall, Electoral Politics and Strategic Voting in State Supreme Courts, 54 J. POL. 427, 442 (1992) 
(“District-based elections, close margins of victory, approaching the end of a term, conditioning 
from previous representational service, and experience in seeking reelection influence liberal 
justices to join conservative majorities in death penalty cases in Texas, North Carolina, 
Louisiana, and Kentucky.”); Gregory A. Huber & Sanford C. Gordon, Accountability and 
Coercion: Is Justice Blind when It Runs for Office?, 48 AM. J. POL. SCI. 247, 261 (2004) (finding 
that judges become more punitive as elections approach); Joanna M. Shepherd, Money, Politics, 
and Impartial Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 623, 660–62, 669–72 (2009) (finding that both campaign 
contributions and the political preferences of the electorate influence judges’ votes). 
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government positions in litigation.131 Because they are subject to 
additional control from their superiors, judges who work within the 
DOJ could be expected to show even greater responsiveness to the 
preferences of these superiors. 
Direct evidence on the impact of this control is incomplete, and 
the evidence that does exist is ambiguous. When Attorney General 
Ashcroft announced that he intended to reduce the size of the BIA 
from twenty-three members to eleven,132 he created a quasi-
experiment. Members of the BIA had good reason to suspect that 
those who took positions perceived as unduly favorable to noncitizens 
would be vulnerable to removal; as noted earlier, such suspicions 
proved well founded.133 The question was whether this situation would 
induce BIA members to shift their positions in cases to align them 
more closely with those of the attorney general. An analysis of en 
banc decisions suggested that some BIA members did so, but this 
response was not universal; four of the nineteen sitting members 
“supported outcomes in closely divided cases that could be viewed 
unfavorably from a conservative perspective.”134 
After the procedural changes of 2002, the proportion of cases 
resolved with summary decisions increased enormously, and the 
proportion of rulings in favor of appellants declined quite 
substantially.135 Both changes came quickly.136 These changes might 
reflect concern by BIA members about their positions, or they could 
simply represent an effort to follow the letter and spirit of the new 
rules for review. The relative importance of those two motivations is 
uncertain. But the attorney general’s effort to change the pattern of 
decisions by BIA members was successful. 
The picture for the immigration courts is more complicated. The 
insecure tenure of immigration judges, the removal of BIA members 
in 2003, and the rules that give government lawyers opportunities to 
put pressure on immigration judges137 all create incentives to favor the 
 
 131. Joanna M. Shepherd, Are Appointed Judges Strategic Too?, 58 DUKE L.J. 1589, 1617 
(2009). 
 132. See supra text accompanying note 121. 
 133. See supra text accompanying note 123. 
 134. Levinson, supra note 122, at 1159. 
 135. DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP, supra note 73, at app. 24. 
 136. Id. At least in asylum cases, the proportions of BIA decisions favorable to individuals 
remained at the new, lower level through fiscal year 2005. See Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 
3, at 359 fig.42 (showing asylum grant and remand rates for fiscal years 1998 through 2005). 
 137. See supra note 117. 
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government.138 On the other hand, reports by immigration judges 
about the control exerted by DOJ superiors suggest that this control 
has considerably more to do with simply disposing of cases than with 
the content of the decisions the judges reach.139 Indeed, in one study, 
most comments by immigration judges about pressures relating to 
decision content referred to pressures from the courts of appeals 
rather than from DOJ officials.140 If immigration judges do feel these 
pressures, the effect favors individuals rather than the government—
because it is rulings against individuals that the courts of appeals can 
review and then remand for reconsideration.141 
In this context, the substantial variation among immigration 
judges’ decisional records in asylum cases is intriguing. This variation 
seems to suggest that judges reach decisions with considerable 
independence despite the controls to which they are subject. In 2006, 
the DOJ initiated a program to address problems in the adjudication 
of immigration cases, including disparities among immigration judges 
in the rates at which they granted asylum.142 Pressures toward 
convergence in decisional records might not be successful, however, 
because judges can be expected to respond to these pressures in 
different ways.143 For the same reason, the continued existence of 
disparities does not mean that judges are generally unresponsive to 
efforts by their superiors to influence the content of their decisions, 
especially if these efforts at control affect subsets of cases or judges 
differentially. 
 
 138. See Legomsky, supra note 4, at 372–75 (describing factors that pressure immigration 
judges to rule in favor of the government); Marcia Coyle, Immigration Judges Seek Article I 
Status, NAT’L L.J., Aug. 10, 2009, at 13 (describing pressures that have led immigration judges to 
seek Article I status to increase their independence). 
 139. See Lustig et al., supra note 64, at 64–65 (quoting survey responses from immigration 
judges complaining of the pressure to dispose of cases quickly). 
 140. Id. at 71–72 (quoting immigration judges’ expressions of frustration about criticism 
from the courts of appeals). 
 141. In 2008, Chief Judge Dennis Jacobs of the Second Circuit reported his understanding 
that a court of appeals decision favorable to an individual “can sometimes lead to the opening of 
a disciplinary inquiry against the immigration judge who issued the ruling.” Executive Office for 
Immigration Review, supra note 117, at 57 (letter from Dennis Jacobs, C.J., United States Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit). If this is true, as Chief Judge Jacobs pointed out, then 
immigration judges might feel considerable pressure to rule in favor of individuals. 
 142. EOIR, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MEASURES TO IMPROVE THE IMMIGRATION COURTS 
AND THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS: DIRECTIVE #8: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING DISPARITIES IN ASYLUM GRANT RATES 1 (2006), available 
at http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/210/include/08-EOIR_asylum_disparity_report.pdf. 
 143. Legomsky, supra note 24, at 435–36. 
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Perhaps the most important lesson about the relationship 
between judges and their political environment in the United States is 
that the ex ante mechanism of choosing judges is considerably more 
powerful than the ex post mechanism of influencing them once they 
are on the bench. Substantial differences in the behavior of liberal 
and conservative appointees to the Supreme Court144 and of 
Democratic and Republican appointees to the lower federal courts145 
demonstrate that officials who select judges can exert strong influence 
on the courts even when those judges enjoy high levels of 
independence. Even state judges who have more limited 
independence from ex post control respond to cases largely on the 
basis of their own ideological positions.146 
These findings point to the significance of any efforts to choose 
judges for immigration cases on the basis of their perceived positions 
on immigration issues. One reason that the primary source of 
immigration judges is trial attorneys in the DHS147 may be a 
perception that these attorneys will be relatively favorable to the 
government’s position when they sit as immigration judges. Indeed, 
the simple relationship between the length of time that an 
immigration judge spent in the former Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS) or the DHS and the proportion of 
decisions favorable to asylum rates is fairly strong.148 
The backgrounds of BIA members are illustrated by the court’s 
membership in late 2009. Those judges came from a variety of 
 
 144. See Jeffrey A. Segal et al., Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court 
Justices Revisited, 57 J. POL. 812, 817 tbl.3 (1995) (showing a correlation between Justices’ 
ideology, as determined by editorials published before their confirmation, and their votes). 
 145. See, e.g., Robert A. Carp, Kenneth L. Manning & Ronald Stidham, Right On: The 
Decision-Making Behavior of George W. Bush’s Judicial Appointees, 92 JUDICATURE 312, 316–
18 (2009) (showing that district judges appointed by Democratic presidents cast higher 
proportions of liberal votes than Republican appointees). 
 146. See LAURA LANGER, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN STATE SUPREME COURTS: A 
COMPARATIVE STUDY 123 (2002) (suggesting that within some limits, state supreme court 
justices are largely free to follow their own ideological preferences). For further statistical 
analysis, see id. at 89–122. 
 147. According to one report, “55 percent of Immigration Judges worked in positions that 
were adversarial to immigrants (the vast majority of whom were Trial Attorneys [in Homeland 
Security]).” APPLESEED, supra note 69, at 9. This finding led to the conclusion that trial 
attorneys in the DHS “serve[] as the farm team for the Immigration Judge corps.” Id. 
 148. See Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 3, at 347 (explaining that past work experience 
with the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) or the DHS is correlated with fewer 
decisions granting asylum). 
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backgrounds,149 though nearly all had prior experience in the 
immigration field. About half had served as immigration judges or in 
nonjudicial positions with the BIA, and some had held academic or 
congressional positions related to immigration law.150 Among the 2009 
members, prior experience in an agency enforcing the immigration 
laws appears to have been considerably more common than 
experience in the private immigration bar,151 and some additional BIA 
members had come directly from DOJ positions outside the 
immigration field.152 If the 2009 membership is typical, then, the prior 
experience of BIA members (like that of immigration judges) leans 
toward the government side. 
Whether or not Attorney General Ashcroft influenced sitting 
members of the BIA by announcing his plan to cut the BIA’s size, his 
apparent use of judges’ decisional records as a criterion for removing 
some of them produced a body that was more sympathetic to his own 
views. Efforts in the George W. Bush administration to hire 
immigration judges on the basis of political affiliation were motivated 
largely by patronage considerations, not solely by ideology,153 but 
judges chosen on the basis of political considerations by a Republican 
administration might be expected to take progovernment positions in 
their decisionmaking. 
Judges on the federal courts of appeals enjoy a high level of 
independence as decisionmakers, and that is true of their work in 
immigration law. In contrast, immigration judges and BIA members 
within the DOJ are subject to significant ex ante and ex post controls. 
The extent to which these controls affect judges’ decisional records is 
uncertain, but the limited independence of DOJ judges in the 
immigration field distinguishes them sharply from Article III judges. 
The difficulty of reaching decisions, the severity of time 
pressures, and the extent of control all affect the process of judging 
 
 149. See EOIR, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FACT SHEET: BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS 
1–5 (2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/fs/biabios.pdf (describing the backgrounds of 
the members of the BIA). 
 150. Id. (describing the prior experience of BIA members). 
 151. Only two of the fourteen BIA members indicated that they had experience in the 
private immigration bar. Id. at 1–2. It is possible that a few other members had such experience 
that their biographical information did not list. 
 152. Id. at 2, 4–5 (describing the BIA members’ DOJ experience). 
 153. See generally OFFICE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY & OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., 
supra note 14, at 69–124 (describing the hiring of immigration judges and BIA members under 
the Bush administration and examining allegations of politically motivated hiring). 
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and the decisions that judges reach. Taken together, these attributes 
differ across the three major sets of adjudicators in immigration law. 
Powerful as these attributes are in themselves, they also create a 
context for specialization by judges. Part II examines specialization 
and its relationship with the other attributes of adjudication. 
II.  JUDICIAL SPECIALIZATION 
All full-time adjudicators are specialized in judging.154 But judges 
vary considerably in the extent of their subject-matter specialization, 
from those who hear very wide ranges of cases to those who hear 
cases involving a single field of law. Scholars and participants in the 
policymaking process have argued persuasively that subject-matter 
specialization can affect courts’ outputs.155 Thus, it may be 
consequential that administrative adjudicators who decide 
immigration cases are specialized in immigration. It may also be 
consequential that court of appeals judges are basically generalists 
and that the growing number of immigration cases has given some 
circuit judges a degree of specialization in immigration law. 
This Part considers the possible effects of judicial specialization 
in broad terms and looks more closely at the relationship between 
specialization and the attributes of adjudication discussed in Part I. 
The central point of this Part is that the impact of judicial 
specialization is intertwined with the impact of other attributes of 
adjudication. Attention to their interrelationship allows a better sense 
of the effects of specialization and ultimately its desirability. 
 
 154. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 248 (1996). 
 155. See STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, SPECIALIZED JUSTICE: COURTS, ADMINISTRATIVE 
TRIBUNALS, AND A CROSS-NATIONAL THEORY OF SPECIALIZATION 7–20 (1990); ISAAC 
UNAH, THE COURTS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE: JUDICIAL SPECIALIZATION, EXPERTISE, 
AND BUREAUCRATIC POLICY MAKING 171–79 (1998); Harold H. Bruff, Specialized Courts in 
Administrative Law, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 329, 331 (1991); David P. Currie & Frank I. Goodman, 
Judicial Review of Federal Administrative Action: Quest for the Optimum Forum, 75 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1, 62–74 (1975); Sarang Vijay Damle, Specialize the Judge, Not the Court: A Lesson from 
the German Constitutional Court, 91 VA. L. REV. 1267, 1268–70 (2005); Rochelle Cooper 
Dreyfuss, Specialized Adjudication, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REV. 377, 377–82; Ellen R. Jordan, 
Specialized Courts: A Choice?, 76 NW. U. L. REV. 745, 784–85 (1981); Nathaniel L. Nathanson, 
The Administrative Court Proposal, 57 VA. L. REV. 996, 998–1001 (1971); Richard L. Revesz, 
Specialized Courts and the Administrative Lawmaking System, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1111, 1143–47 
(1990); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Two Cheers for Specialization, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 67, 88–109 
(1995). 
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A. Specialization as an Attribute of Courts 
Judges who serve in the federal executive branch are primarily 
specialists who hear cases in a single field of law.156 In the federal 
judicial branch, in contrast, adjudication in most fields of law is done 
by the district courts, courts of appeals, and the Supreme Court, and 
the members of all those courts clearly are generalists.157 The 
generalist quality of federal court judges distinguishes them sharply 
from the specialized administrative judges in the federal executive 
branch. 
But this difference between the federal judicial branch and the 
executive branch in the extent of specialization by judges is not 
inevitable. Judges in the executive branch could be given the power to 
hear a wide range of cases rather than cases involving a single topic 
such as immigration. Indeed, executive-branch judges in some states 
serve on central panels; they hear cases arising in multiple agencies 
and thus are not narrowly specialized.158 At least one commentator 
has proposed that the federal government adopt a similar practice.159 
Further, there is a good deal of specialization within the judicial 
branch as well, more than most observers of the courts recognize.160 
 
 156. For more information on executive branch judges and adjudication in the federal 
government, see Frye, supra note 114, at 261–63; Daniel J. Gifford, Federal Administrative Law 
Judges: The Relevance of Past Choices to Future Directions, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 52–59 (1997). 
 157. This is not to say that there are no elements of specialization in these courts. For 
instance, judges on the courts of appeals have a degree of specialization in opinion writing, and 
in two circuits, immigration cases constitute a large minority of the agenda. See infra Part III.B. 
 158. See Thomas E. Ewing, Oregon’s Hearing Officer Panel, 23 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. 
JUDGES 57, 80 (2003) (discussing the utility of cross-training for ALJs in Oregon’s central panel 
system); Allen Hoberg, Administrative Hearings: State Central Panels in the 1990s, 46 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 75, 78–81 (1994) (examining the jurisdiction and structure of central administrative panels 
in various states); Marvin F. Kittrell, ALJs in South Carolina, S.C. LAW., May–June 1996, at 42, 
42 (discussing South Carolina’s central panel system; Ann Wise, Louisiana’s Division of 
Administrative Law: An Independent Administrative Hearings Tribunal, 68 LA. L. REV. 1169, 
1191 (2008) (discussing Louisiana’s central panel judges). 
 159. Jeffrey S. Lubbers, A Unified Corps of ALJs: A Proposal to Test the Idea at the Federal 
Level, 65 JUDICATURE 266, 267–68 (1981). 
 160. In addition to the federal courts discussed in the text, many specialized courts exist in 
the states. For a list of state courts that are considered to be specialized and that are listed as 
separate bodies on organization charts, see COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, NAT’L CTR. FOR 
STATE COURTS, STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS, 2007, at 16–67 (2008), available at 
http://www.ncsconline.org/D_Research/csp/2007_files/State%20Court%20Caseload%20Statistic
s%202007.pdf. There is also a great deal of unofficial specialization in state trial courts, based on 
temporary or permanent assignments of judges to hear specific categories of cases. MICHAEL 
WILLRICH, CITY OF COURTS: SOCIALIZING JUSTICE IN PROGRESSIVE ERA CHICAGO 119–240 
(2003). 
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The federal court system includes several courts with judges who 
permanently hear only a limited range of cases: the Court of Federal 
Claims, the Tax Court, the Court of International Trade, the Court of 
Appeals for Veterans Claims, the Court of Appeals for the Armed 
Forces, bankruptcy courts, and the Federal Circuit. Judges are also 
borrowed from the district courts and courts of appeals for part-time 
service on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, and a similar 
arrangement was used for courts such as the Emergency Court of 
Appeals and the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals.161 
Thus, adjudicators in the executive branch can be generalists, 
and adjudicators in the judicial branch can be specialists. In practice, 
however, adjudication in the executive branch is far more specialized 
than in the judicial branch. Why does this difference exist? The best 
answer probably lies in the existence of different traditions in the two 
branches. 
The executive branch follows the general pattern in modern 
society, in that it features high levels of specialization. Individual 
administrative agencies deal with a relatively narrow range of policy 
issues, and units within those agencies deal with even narrower 
subsets of policy matters. Integrated into the agencies in which they 
adjudicate cases,162 administrative judges naturally incorporate the 
specializations of these agencies. 
In contrast, a strong expectation has developed in the federal 
judicial branch that judges are, and should be, generalists. Judges 
themselves frequently express this expectation.163 The power of this 
expectation is reflected in the efforts of judges on the Federal Circuit 
 
  The overall extent of specialization in the judiciary is difficult to characterize, not only 
because so much of the state-level specialization is unofficial but also because specialization has 
multiple dimensions and forms. For a discussion of that variation in specialization, see Lawrence 
Baum, Probing the Effects of Judicial Specialization, 58 DUKE L.J. 1667, 1671–75 (2009). 
 161. See Fed. Judicial Ctr., Courts of the Federal Judiciary, http://www.fjc.gov/history/ 
courts.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2010) (discussing several of the current specialized courts, 
along with some specialized courts of the past). For a broad survey of current and past 
specialized federal courts, see Lawrence Baum, Specializing the Federal Courts: Neutral Reforms 
or Efforts to Shape Judicial Policy?, 74 JUDICATURE 217, 220–22 (1991). 
 162. See Michael Asimow, The Administrative Judiciary: ALJ’s in Historical Perspective, 20 
J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 157, 161–64 (2000) (discussing the historical development of 
ALJs and agency integration). 
 163. See Edward K. Cheng, The Myth of the Generalist Judge, 61 STAN. L. REV. 519, 521 n.2 
(2008) (providing several judges’ explanations of the benefits of having generalist judges). 
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to depict themselves as generalists rather than specialists.164 Thus, 
although the extent of specialization in the federal judiciary has 
grown over time,165 the heart of the federal judicial system remains a 
set of generalist courts. 
Judicial specialization is a continuum rather than a dichotomy. 
The ends of the continuum can be described in a fairly 
straightforward way. At one end, a judge hears cases in a wide range 
of legal fields, and no field accounts for a substantial proportion of 
the judge’s work.166 At the other end, a judge hears cases in a single 
field of law.167 
Judges on the specialized federal courts differ in where they 
stand on this continuum. Judges serving on the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court are generalists with a part-time specialization. The 
Court of Federal Claims hears a moderately wide range of cases 
involving monetary claims against the federal government,168 and the 
Federal Circuit hears cases in several different fields.169 The other 
courts hear narrower ranges of cases. For example, the Court of 
 
 164. See, e.g., Immigration Litigation Reduction, supra note 10, at 141, 143 (letters from Paul 
R. Michel, C.J., U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit). In subsequent references, this 
court will be referred to simply as the Federal Circuit. 
 165. Through 1900, the Court of Claims was the only permanent specialized federal court. 
See Baum, supra note 161, at 219. The number of permanent specialized courts grew over the 
twentieth century, gradually increasing the proportion of federal jurisdiction that was allocated 
to specialized bodies. Id. (tracing the increase in congressional decisions adding jurisdiction to 
specialized federal courts). 
 166. The term “field” has a degree of ambiguity, in that legal fields might be defined in 
different ways. For the most part, that ambiguity can be ignored in this Article, because it is 
reasonable to treat immigration as a distinct field. 
 167. This description is framed in terms of judges rather than courts because it is primarily 
the individual judge whose degree of specialization is consequential. If a court has broad 
jurisdiction but a judge on that court hears only a narrow range of cases, that judge should be 
treated as a specialist. The distinction between judges and courts is most important at the state 
trial level, where judges on courts that have broad jurisdiction often are assigned specific types 
of cases, either temporarily or permanently. For instance, a 1977 survey of judges in general 
jurisdiction courts found that 12 percent of the judges on those courts were hearing only 
criminal cases. JOHN PAUL RYAN ET AL., AMERICAN TRIAL JUDGES: THEIR WORK STYLES 
AND PERFORMANCE 23 (1980). Trial courts in large cities are typically divided into specialized 
divisions to which judges are assigned for some period of time. See, e.g., Circuit Court of Cook 
County, State of Ill., Organizational Chart, http://www.cookcountycourt.org/about/flowchart. 
html (last visited Mar. 28, 2010) (mapping Chicago’s specialized divisions). 
 168. Steven L. Schooner, The Future: Scrutinizing the Empirical Case for the Court of 
Federal Claims, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 714, 719–36 (2003) (discussing the jurisdiction of the 
Court of Federal Claims). 
 169. U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT, APPEALS FILED AND 
ADJUDICATED, BY CATEGORY, FY 2009 (2009), http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/pdf/TableAppeals 
FiledTerminated09.pdf (showing the distribution of Federal Circuit cases). 
BAUM IN FINAL.DOC 3/30/2010  6:02:36 AM 
2010] JUDICIAL SPECIALIZATION 1535 
Appeals for Veterans Claims hears the same type of case as the 
Board of Veterans’ Appeals, an administrative court within the 
Department of Veterans Affairs.170 Analyses of specialization as an 
attribute of adjudication need to take gradations of specialization into 
account.171 
Greater subject-matter specialization for judges is usually 
accompanied by reductions in the number of judges who hear cases in 
the field or fields in which a court specializes. If a specialized court 
replaced the federal district courts in the social security field, one 
result would be to concentrate social security cases among the 
specialized court judges rather than to spread them among the 
hundreds of district judges. That result is consequential. To take the 
most obvious example, a reduction in the number of “decisional 
units”172 that hear cases in a particular field is likely to increase the 
uniformity of legal interpretation in the field.173 More subtly, such a 
reduction may subject judges to greater influence from external 
sources that care about courts’ work in a field of law, because those 
sources can concentrate their influence on a smaller number of 
judges. In the analysis of judicial specialization, the concentration of 
 
 170. See 38 U.S.C. § 7252(a) (2006) (describing the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals for 
Veterans Claims). 
 171. For example, Stephen Legomsky argues that courts specializing in a single field are 
undesirable but those with multiple specialties can provide important benefits. LEGOMSKY, 
supra note 155, at 38–42. 
  If legal fields could be defined with precision, see supra note 156, the degree of 
specialization for any single judge could be ascertained with a measure such as the Herfindahl-
Hirschmann Index, a standard measure of concentration among firms in an industry, see Amos 
Golan, George Judge & Jeffrey M. Perloff, Estimating the Size Distribution of Firms Using 
Government Summary Statistics, 44 J. INDUS. ECON. 69, 70–71 (1996) (describing the 
Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index). 
 172. Legomsky, supra note 24, at 428. 
 173. This effect is easy to exaggerate; so long as there are multiple decisional units, 
considerable variation in standards for decision may exist. Thus, concentrating cases in a single 
court is less likely to produce uniformity if cases are decided by single-judge or three-judge units 
within the court. Id. at 429. 
  An example is the patent jurisprudence of the Federal Circuit, which decides the great 
majority of cases in three-judge panels. Judges on the Federal Circuit have adopted different 
approaches to the construction of claims in patents, resulting in divergent standards in the 
court’s decisions. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1330–35 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (Mayer, J., 
dissenting) (criticizing the lack of a standard method for deciding patent claims); JAMES BESSEN 
& MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS 
PUT INNOVATION AT RISK 58–61 (2008) (discussing the problem of a climate of uncertain claim 
construction in patent courts); R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit 
Succeeding? An Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1176 
(2004). 
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cases in a field among a smaller number of decisional units should be 
taken into account.174 
B. The Effects of Judicial Specialization 
Scholars have devoted considerable thought to the effects of 
specialization on adjudication, especially in the federal courts.175 
Those effects might be categorized in several ways. This Article will 
consider three categories: changes in the identities of the judges who 
decide cases in a field, experience deciding large numbers of cases in 
a field, and outside influence on judges. To simplify the discussion, 
this Section will compare judges who stand at the opposite ends of the 
continuum of specialization. 
1. Identities of Judges.  Giving jurisdiction over a field to a 
specialized court rather than dividing it among generalist courts 
automatically changes the identities of the judges who decide cases in 
a field. If the two sets of judges are exactly alike in their relevant 
traits, this change will have no impact in itself.176 But even if judges 
are selected randomly, that is unlikely to occur. Moreover, the 
existence of a specialized court can be expected to change the 
characteristics of the judges who decide cases in a field. 
One source of this change is self-selection. The subset of lawyers 
who are interested in serving on the Tax Court likely differs from the 
 
 174. The relationship between the level of judicial specialization and the number of 
decisional units is imperfect. Judges on a particular court may hear cases in multiple fields of 
law but have exclusive jurisdiction over one or more of those fields. Thus, advocates of the 
Federal Circuit’s creation emphasized the potential advantage of enhanced uniformity in the 
standard of patentability, even though patent law was only one of the fields in which the court 
would work. Donald W. Banner, Witness at the Creation, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 557, 560 
(1992). Indeed, a court with very broad jurisdiction may have exclusive jurisdiction over a 
particular class of cases. For example, appeals from certain administrative agencies go solely to 
the federal court of appeals for the District of Columbia. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 historical and 
revision notes, 1294 orders reviewable (2006). Conversely, if judges are specialized but cases are 
divided among a large number of them, uniformity is unlikely. This is true of the bankruptcy 
courts, which currently have more than three hundred judges. Id. § 152. 
  The concentration of cases in a field among a small number of judges might be 
considered a second dimension of specialization. See Lawrence Baum, Judicial Specialization, 
Litigant Influence, and Substantive Policy: The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, 11 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 823, 826–27 (1977); Revesz, supra note 155, at 1121–30. 
 175. See sources cited supra note 155. This discussion of the effects of specialization draws in 
part from Baum, supra note 160, at 1675–80. 
 176. Of course, the same judge could behave quite differently on a specialized court than on 
a generalist court. For a discussion of the effects of specialization that are separate from the 
identities of judges, see infra Part II.B.2–3. 
BAUM IN FINAL.DOC 3/30/2010  6:02:36 AM 
2010] JUDICIAL SPECIALIZATION 1537 
subset who are interested in serving on federal district courts. Many 
lawyers would rule out the Tax Court because they lack interest and 
expertise in the tax field, and many lawyers would consider the 
district courts more attractive simply because they are generalist 
courts. On the other hand, specialists in tax law might find the Tax 
Court more attractive because they could focus on the field in which 
they have the most interest and expertise. 
The other source of change is the criteria used to select judges. In 
choosing members of the Tax Court, officials in the executive branch 
might limit themselves to candidates who have demonstrated 
expertise in tax law. If they seek to protect the interests of the federal 
government in tax litigation, they might choose judges whose 
backgrounds and expressions of policy preferences suggest that they 
are sympathetic to the government’s position. Alternatively, they 
might respond to lobbying by the private tax bar and choose judges 
who are sympathetic to individual taxpayers or to some subset of 
taxpayers (such as businesses). 
Because of these mechanisms, judges who serve on specialized 
courts sometimes bring to their judicial service greater expertise in 
the subject matter they confront than generalist judges. Indeed, 
expertise in tax law is treated as a prerequisite for service on the Tax 
Court.177 In turn, this expertise could foster greater efficiency in 
deciding cases and greater effectiveness in reaching high-quality 
decisions.178 These are the two benefits that are regularly ascribed to 
 
 177. Of the thirty-two active, senior, and special trial judges on the court as of January 2010, 
all had substantial experience in tax law prior to their appointments. See U.S. Tax Court, 
Judges, http://www.ustaxcourt.gov/judges.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2010) (describing the 
biographies of the judges); see also Nominations of David L. Aaron, Mary Ann Cohen, Margaret 
Ann Hamburg, M.D., Stanford G. Ross, Ph.D., and David W. Wilcox, Ph.D.: Hearing Before the 
S. Comm. on Finance, 105th Cong. 48, 52–54 (1997) (biographical information of Mary Ann 
Cohen, J., U.S. Tax Court) (recounting the extensive tax law background of Judge Mary Ann 
Cohen, the only judge whose prior tax experience is not disclosed on the U.S. Tax Court’s 
website). 
 178. Effectiveness is an imprecise term that requires some discussion. Advocates of and 
commentators on judicial specialization often refer to expertise rather than effectiveness. E.g., 
Currie & Goodman, supra note 155, at 67–68; Damle, supra note 155, at 1277. What they mean, 
however, is that expertise can produce more effective decisionmaking. In conventional legal 
terms, effectiveness means interpreting the law more accurately. However, effectiveness can be 
understood more generally in terms of what judges are trying to accomplish. For judges who 
seek to advance their conceptions of good policy, effectiveness refers to success in identifying 
the choices that are consistent with those conceptions. For more information on the meaning of 
effectiveness and related concepts in the context of judicial specialization, see LEGOMSKY, 
supra note 155, at 7–16; Baum, supra note 160, at 1676. 
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specialization in any sector of government or society179 and the major 
benefits (along with uniformity) that are frequently ascribed to 
judicial specialization.180 
Specialists in a particular legal field bring with them not only 
expertise but also points of view about the issues in the field. If there 
is a dominant point of view among lawyers in a field, such as patent 
lawyers’ preference for a relatively lenient standard of patentability, 
the interpretations of law in a specialized court in that field may 
reflect that point of view.181 Even if there is no dominant point of 
view, judges may be selected to reflect a particular position within the 
field. 
2. Experience on the Court.  Whether or not judges on a 
specialized court have prior experience in the field of their court’s 
work, they become specialists once they begin their judicial service. 
Thus, they gain expertise in their field more quickly than judges on a 
generalist court. By doing so, they likely increase the efficiency and 
effectiveness with which cases are decided.182 
Specialization in a particular field of law can affect judges’ 
perceptions and perspectives in other ways. To take one example, 
judges’ self-confidence in their expertise in a field can lead them to 
 
 179. See, e.g., HERBERT A. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR: A STUDY OF DECISION-
MAKING PROCESSES IN ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION 10, 20 (1947) (noting expertise, 
responsibility, and efficiency as the expected benefits of specialized administration). 
 180. Efficiency and effectiveness in themselves are policy neutral, and they are usually 
treated as such. However, they may affect the interests of the two sides in litigation. For 
instance, judges who develop expertise in a field might tend toward one side. Indeed, advocates 
of judicial specialization often assume that their side will benefit from judicial expertise. See, 
e.g., Michael Landau & Donald E. Biederman, The Case for a Specialized Copyright Court: 
Eliminating the Jurisdictional Advantage, 21 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 717, 774–84 (1999) 
(asserting that a specialized copyright court would produce more correct and consistent results, 
which would favor copyright holders). Similarly, efficiency could speed the completion of cases, 
which might favor the interests of one side. 
 181. For more information on the preferences of patent lawyers, see Baum, supra note 174, 
at 835; Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent System 
Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1075 (2003). Indeed, once presidents began to appoint 
patent lawyers to the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals in the 1950s, this court  adopted a 
more lenient standard of patentability. Baum, supra note 174, at 842–44. 
 182. The positive effects of judges’ specialized experience on their effectiveness might be 
countered by negative effects, because specialized judges may lack knowledge about 
developments in other fields of law. Similarly, the effects of specialization in bringing judges 
with expertise to a court might be countered by the relative unattractiveness of a specialized 
court to some of the most qualified candidates for judgeships. For a discussion of these possible 
negative effects of specialization on effectiveness, see Currie & Goodman, supra note 155, at 70; 
Damle, supra note 155, at 1281, 1285–86; Revesz, supra note 155, at 1161–65. 
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take more assertive positions in policymaking. That assertiveness 
might take the form of a readiness to overturn administrative 
decisions on review183 or to depart from prior interpretations of the 
law that were made by generalist courts. 
Another example is insularity; that is, a narrow perspective based 
on the field in which a judge works. In the bureaucracy, insularity has 
been captured by Miles’ Law: “[W]here you stand depends on where 
you sit.”184 In other words, officials tend to see issues in terms of the 
values and interests of the field in which they work, and they may be 
unfamiliar with competing values and interests. This narrow 
perspective can lead specialized judges to decide cases in their field 
with little attention to relevant developments in other fields of law. 
Another effect can be a sense of responsibility for the success of a 
government program whose decisions a court reviews. 
3. External Influences on Judges.  Every court exists in an 
environment of litigants, lawyers, and others who care about its 
decisions. These people may influence court decisions by affecting 
judges’ ability to achieve important goals, such as continued tenure in 
office, or by shaping the views of judges through interaction with 
them. The potential for such influence in a field increases if the judges 
are specialized. Individuals and groups have a greater incentive to 
seek influence over a specialized court in their field, which has a 
greater impact on their interests, than over a generalist court.185 
Those involved in a field also have a better opportunity to 
succeed in their efforts to exert influence, because they are more 
important to a specialized court and its judges than to courts that hear 
cases in a wide array of fields.186 Regular participation in a court 
enhances the ability of a set of lawyers to shape judges’ views and to 
develop cooperative relationships with them. Put differently, judicial 
specialization makes it easier for litigants to gain the benefits of 
 
 183. UNAH, supra note 155, at 131–70; Bruff, supra note 155, at 332; Currie & Goodman, 
supra note 155, at 71. 
 184. Rufus E. Miles, Jr., The Origin and Meaning of Miles’ Law, 38 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 399, 
399–400 (1978). 
 185. The number of decisional units is also relevant. The division of bankruptcy cases 
among more than three hundred judges, each of whom decides cases as an individual, means 
that any specific bankruptcy judge has less impact on the interests of a group that cares about 
bankruptcy law than a member of the Court of International Trade or the Federal Circuit has 
for groups that care about the fields in which these courts work. 
 186. Bruff, supra note 155, at 331–32; Currie & Goodman, supra note 155, at 70–71; 
Dreyfuss, supra note 155, at 379–80. 
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repeat player status in a court.187 To the extent that judges are 
susceptible to external pressure, groups that are capable of exerting 
such pressure are in a better position to do so when a court deals only 
with a single field. 
In any field of law, there are competing litigants and lawyers on 
the two sides. Their gross influence on a court is less important than 
their net influence (that is, the influence of people and groups on one 
side relative to the other side). In some specialized courts, the two 
sides’ capacities to shape judges’ perspectives and exert external 
pressure may be approximately equal, so that they have little net 
effect. But in some fields, one side may have a substantial advantage 
over its rival. 
This is especially true when one side is a government. In both the 
state and federal judicial systems, governments are regular 
participants in most specialized courts.188 Governments are in a 
uniquely strong position as litigants,189 and their unique advantages 
enhance their opportunities for influence over specialized courts. 
Generalizations about external influence on sitting judges also 
apply to the process of selecting judges, and here the government’s 
advantage is clearest. The selection of judges for those courts reflects 
this advantage. Except for the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Court, whose members are chosen by the Chief Justice from judges 
on the federal district courts and courts of appeals,190 judges on the 
current specialized federal courts191 are all nominated by the 
 
 187. Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal 
Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 97–123 (1974). 
 188. At the state level, judicial specialization is greatest in criminal law. Of the current 
specialized federal courts, most hear solely litigation in which the government is a party. (The 
bankruptcy courts hear primarily cases involving private parties, and the Federal Circuit hears a 
mix of government and private litigation.) 
 189. Herbert M. Kritzer, The Government Gorilla: Why Does Government Come Out Ahead 
in Appellate Courts?, in IN LITIGATION: DO THE “HAVES” STILL COME OUT AHEAD? 342, 342–
70 (Herbert M. Kritzer & Susan Silbey eds., 2003). 
 190. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court rules on applications for warrants for 
electronic surveillance for national security purposes. For a discussion of the court and the Chief 
Justice’s appointments to its judgeships, see Theodore W. Ruger, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s 
Appointments to the FISA Court: An Empirical Perspective, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 239, 252–57 
(2006). The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review hears government appeals from 
denials of warrants; because there are few such appeals, the Court of Review seldom meets. See 
Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Orders 1979–2007, http://epic.org/ 
privacy/wiretap/stats/fisa_stats.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2010) (compiling the record of the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, based on the court’s annual reports). 
 191. See supra note 161 and accompanying text. 
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president.192 When the president has the power to select the members 
of specialized courts, the executive branch agencies that litigate in 
those courts are in a better position to shape the president’s choices 
than their private sector opponents.193 
The potential effects of judicial specialization subsumed within 
the three categories discussed in this Section are all plausible, but by 
no means are they guaranteed. Systematic evidence on the 
performance of specialized courts is fairly slim; there is only 
fragmentary information about the actual effects of specialization.194 
The evidence that does exist, however, shows that those effects are 
not straightforward. Indeed, effects that seem nearly certain to follow 
from specialization do not necessarily occur in practice. To take one 
example,195 many of the past and present federal specialized courts 
 
 192. Baum, supra note 160, at 1679; Currie & Goodman, supra note 155, at 14; Revesz, 
supra note 155, at 1146–47. 
 193. For this reason, the government’s opponents sometimes suspect that the government is 
building a favorable bias in the courts through selection of judges. This was true of the Tax 
Court’s early days. See HAROLD DUBROFF, THE UNITED STATES TAX COURT: AN HISTORICAL 
ANALYSIS 85–86 (1979) (discussing a fear of bias in selections made by the Treasury 
Department in 1924). 
 194. See Baum, supra note 160, at 1680–84 (cautioning against sweeping conclusions given 
the dearth of data on the effects of specialized courts). There does exist an array of research that 
provides insights into the effects of judicial specialization. See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Chris 
Guthrie & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Bankruptcy Judge’s Mind, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1227, 1230 
(2006) (using bankruptcy judges as a case study to examine the impact of specialization on 
judicial decisions). 
  Some of this research takes the form of detailed studies of particular courts or sets of 
courts. E.g., 2 JONATHAN LURIE, PURSUING MILITARY JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED 
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ARMED FORCES, 1951–1980, at 71–106 (1998); ELLEN 
RYERSON, THE BEST-LAID PLANS: AMERICA’S JUVENILE COURT EXPERIMENT 3–16 (1978); 
WILLRICH, supra note 160, at 119–277 (2003) (studying several Chicago courts); James R. 
Elkins, The Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals: A Study in the Abdication of Judicial 
Responsibility, 1978 DUKE L.J. 113, 120–53. 
  Other research makes direct comparisons between generalist and specialized courts. 
E.g., MICHELE SVIRIDOFF ET AL., DISPENSING JUSTICE LOCALLY: THE IMPLEMENTATION AND 
EFFECTS OF THE MIDTOWN COMMUNITY COURT 109–38 (2000) (comparing the Manhattan 
Midtown Community Court and Downtown Manhattan Court); UNAH, supra note 155, at 132–
36, 154–57 (comparing the Court of International Trade, the Federal Circuit, and generalist 
federal courts); Michael Morley, The Case Against a Specialized Court for Federal Benefits 
Appeals, 17 FED. CIR. B.J. 379, 383–84 (2008) (comparing reversal rates between generalist and 
specialist courts subject to Federal Circuit review); Jonathan Remy Nash & Rafael I. Pardo, An 
Empirical Investigation into Appellate Structure and the Perceived Quality of Appellate Review, 
61 VAND. L. REV. 1745, 1803–07 (2008) (comparing the rates at which the courts of appeals 
reversed specialist bankruptcy appellate panels and generalist federal district courts in 
bankruptcy cases). 
 195. A second example is the lack of full uniformity of legal standards in patent law despite 
the consolidation of patent appeals in the Federal Circuit. See supra note 173. 
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were created primarily to protect the government’s interests in 
litigation.196 Executive branch officials could use their power to 
choose judges to staff these specialized courts with judges who seem 
sympathetic to the government’s interests. But in practice, they have 
made only limited use of that opportunity. The primary reason for 
this limited use seems to be that the officials who help to select judges 
often see these courts as relatively unimportant, so they emphasize 
patronage considerations over policy considerations in 
appointments.197 
This gap between likely and actual effects should not be 
surprising. Inevitably, the impact of judicial specialization depends on 
the conditions under which generalist and specialized courts operate. 
The actual effects of giving jurisdiction over a field to a specialized 
court will depend on variables such as the mechanisms for selection of 
judges, the technicality of their work, the substantive and procedural 
legal rules that govern the court, and the configuration of interest 
groups in the field. As a result, the relationship between 
specialization and the outputs that courts produce is highly complex. 
C. Interactions between Specialization and Other Attributes of 
Adjudication 
The discussion thus far has considered the possible effects of 
specialization on adjudication in broad terms. The discussion can be 
applied to the relationship between specialization and the other 
attributes of adjudication considered in Part I. That relationship has 
two sides. On the one hand, specialization can shape these other 
attributes. On the other hand, these attributes help determine the 
impact of specialization. These interrelationships are quite relevant to 
the three attributes discussed in this Article. 
1. The Difficulty of Cases.  If specialization can improve judges’ 
efficiency and effectiveness in deciding cases, these effects would 
likely increase with the difficulty of the cases. Thus, it is not surprising 
 
 196. For a discussion of the motivations for the establishment of federal specialized courts, 
see Baum, supra note 161, at 217. 
 197. HAROLD W. CHASE, FEDERAL JUDGES: THE APPOINTING PROCESS 45–46 (1972). In at 
least one instance, an appointment strategy actually worked against the government’s interest as 
a litigant. The Reagan and George H.W. Bush administrations chose judges for the Claims 
Court (now the Court of Federal Claims) whose conservative views inclined them to favor 
claims against the government under the Takings Clause. See W. John Moore, ‘Just 
Compensation,’ NAT’L J., June 13, 1992, at 1404, 1405–06. 
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that there have been long-standing efforts to secure greater 
specialization of judges in the adjudication of federal tax and patent 
cases, given that the Internal Revenue Code is unusually complex and 
the facts of many patent cases are unusually technical.198 
But some difficulties are more amenable to expertise than 
others. A specialist in tax law may fully understand provisions of the 
federal tax code that are unintelligible to a generalist lawyer or judge. 
A judge who is familiar with computer software may readily 
comprehend the issues involving a software patent. In contrast, some 
issues that arise in court cases are inherently difficult, regardless of a 
judge’s experience or expertise. Judges who have presided over 
hundreds of trials may never gain any great aptitude in assessing the 
credibility of witnesses, simply because assessment of credibility is so 
difficult.199 If judges think they have gained such aptitude, they are 
likely wrong. 
Thus, there may be a curvilinear relationship between case 
difficulty and the potential benefits of specialization. Some types of 
cases are so easy that specialists can gain little over generalists in 
efficiency or effectiveness. Patent and tax law fall in an intermediate 
category, in which specialization produces substantial benefits in 
efficiency and effectiveness. But in a third category, the difficulties 
run so deep that specialization is of little use in dealing with them. 
Even if a curvilinear relationship exists, this tripartite categorization 
is an oversimplification, but it underlines the complexity of the 
relationship between judges’ specialization and their efficiency and 
effectiveness. 
2. Time Pressures.  Judicial specialization might ease the pressure 
of heavy caseloads on judges simply by enhancing efficiency. Because 
the gains in efficiency from judicial specialization are assumed rather 
than measured, however, it is uncertain how substantial those gains 
actually are. In any field, there are limits to how much the speed of 
 
 198. See, e.g., HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 153–67 
(1973) (noting the complexity of patent and tax laws as historical factors motivating 
specialization). 
 199. See Michael J. Saks, Enhancing and Restraining Accuracy in Adjudication, 51 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 243, 262–65 (1988) (concluding that demeanor evidence is often no more 
reliable than flipping a coin to determine truth or falsity and that people identify the wrong 
behavior as indicating the truth or falsity of a speaker’s statement). 
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case processing can be increased before it has an impact on a court’s 
effectiveness or other qualities of its outputs.200 
Specialization may have an indirect effect on time pressures as 
well. Depending on the circumstances under which it is created, a 
specialized court may increase the ratio of judges to cases and thereby 
reduce time pressures in a particular field. To take one example, 
transferring cases in a field from overburdened generalist judges to 
underburdened specialists will produce this effect; this was the case 
when the Court of Customs Appeals was given jurisdiction over 
appeals from Patent Office decisions in 1929.201 
If specialization can affect caseload pressures, these pressures 
also help determine the effects of specialization. Under most 
conditions, heavy time pressures seem likely to reduce the differences 
between generalist and specialized courts. When judges must give 
precedence to case disposition, the imperative of processing cases 
quickly will narrow the effects of judges’ own attributes—including 
their specialization in a particular field of law. The expertise that 
judges develop through specialization might produce only limited 
benefits when they have little time to apply that expertise to 
individual cases. Further, regardless of their degree of specialization, 
judges will be heavily dependent on the inputs they receive from 
litigants and lawyers when there is little time to dig deeply into a case. 
On the other hand, it is possible that caseload pressures enhance the 
effects of expertise, in that judges who are highly familiar with the 
issues in a field can overcome the difficulties of making decisions 
quickly in a way that is simply impossible for a judge who lacks that 
familiarity. 
 
 200. After an influx of drug prosecutions in the 1970s and 1980s, New York City and 
Chicago created special drug courts to process these cases more efficiently. (These drug courts 
were different from the “problem-solving” drug courts that were later established in many 
cities.) One result was that patterns of case outcomes changed. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, ASSESSMENT OF THE FEASIBILITY OF DRUG NIGHT 
COURTS 10–16 (1993); Steven Belenko, Jeffrey A. Fagan & Tamar Dumanovsky, The Effects of 
Legal Sanctions on Recidivism in Special Drug Courts, 17 JUST. SYS. J. 53, 56–58 (1994); Barbara 
E. Smith et al., Burning the Midnight Oil: An Examination of Cook County’s Night Drug Court, 
17 JUST. SYS. J. 41, 46–47 (1994). 
 201. See P.J. Federico, Evolution of Patent Office Appeals, 22 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 838, 853–56 
(1940) (noting an increased caseload and time pressures, which required greater delegation to 
achieve more individualized attention for patent-related issues). 
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3. Control.  For the reasons discussed earlier in this Part,202 
judicial specialization can facilitate ex ante and ex post control of 
judicial decisionmaking.203 When judges hear cases in only one field, 
selectors of those judges who seek to use their selection power to 
shape court policies can focus on that field. Moreover, “[i]t is easier to 
predict how judges will decide cases in their specialty than how they 
will decide cases across the board.”204 By the same token, 
policymakers who have power over a court—bureaucratic or judicial 
superiors, legislatures, chief executives—can observe and respond to 
a court’s work more easily when that work is concentrated in one 
area.205 As already discussed in regard to the selection of judges,206 
those in a position to exert control over a court through either ex ante 
or ex post mechanisms do not necessarily make use of their powers. If 
they do so, however, specialization facilitates their efforts. 
Substantive and procedural rules that accompany judicial 
specialization may be considered a second form of ex ante control. 
When Congress gives a new specialized court jurisdiction that 
previously did not exist, as it has done for some federal courts,207 
Congress also needs to establish rules for the exercise of that 
jurisdiction. But even when Congress transfers jurisdiction from 
generalist to specialized courts, it can accompany that transfer with 
new legal rules that affect the work of the specialized court. Indeed, 
that has been a common practice. And if administration officials or 
members of Congress want to move the new court’s decisions in one 
 
 202. For a discussion of “Identities of Judges” and “Influences on Judges,” see supra Part 
II.B.1, 3. 
 203. POSNER, supra note 154, at 254. 
 204. Id.; see also Howard Gillman, Party Politics and Constitutional Change: The Political 
Origins of Liberal Judicial Activism, in THE SUPREME COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICAL 
DEVELOPMENT 138, 141 (Ronald Kahn & Ken I. Kersch eds., 2006) (“[I]t is comparatively more 
difficult to find decision makers who will be reliable on a wide range of issues than it is to find 
appointees who will act reliably over a narrowly defined set of policies . . . .”). 
 205. For federal courts, one relevant factor is that much of the congressional oversight of 
generalist courts occurs in the Judiciary Committees, whereas oversight of some specialized 
courts occurs in the committees whose jurisdiction is in the court’s field (such as the Veterans’ 
Affairs committees for the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims). Members and staff on these 
specialized committees have relatively strong incentives and capabilities for monitoring the 
court in their field. 
 206. See supra note 197 and accompanying text. 
 207. Among current courts, this was true of the Court of Military Appeals (now the Court of 
Appeals for the Armed Forces), the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, and the Court of 
Veterans Appeals (now the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims). 
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direction or another, they can write rules that are highly favorable to 
one side.208 
Ex post control reduces the range of discretion available to a 
decisionmaker. In the process, it limits the impact of any differences 
among judges. If elected judges feel strong pressure to issue stricter 
sentences as elections approach, for instance, then this pressure may 
reduce differences in sentencing practices between liberal and 
conservative judges.209 Similarly, any effects of specialization on 
courts’ outputs can be expected to diminish with increases in the level 
of control over judges. 
It is in regard to ex post control that judges in the executive 
branch differ most from those in the judiciary.210 To the extent that 
the discretion of administrative judges is limited by hierarchical 
control, the specialization that characterizes most of them makes less 
difference than it otherwise would. This relationship underlines the 
most important lesson of this Part—that the effects of judicial 
specialization are contingent on other attributes of adjudication. 
III.  SPECIALIZATION IN THE ADJUDICATION  
OF IMMIGRATION CASES 
A great deal of specialization exists in the adjudication of 
immigration cases. Immigration judges and members of the BIA are 
specialists in the field of immigration. In contrast, judges on the 
federal courts of appeals are fundamentally generalists. There is a 
degree of specialization in immigration in the courts of appeals, 
however, because of the large numbers of petitions for review in two 
of the federal circuits. Some legislators and scholars have proposed 
enhancing the degree of specialization in the adjudication of 
 
 208. Legislation of this type was enacted for the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. See 
50 U.S.C. § 1803(a) (2006) (establishing that judges need to write opinions only if they deny an 
application for surveillance); id. § 1805(a)(3) (requiring a limited scope of probable cause 
inquiry for warrant applications). Another example was the Emergency Court of Appeals, 
which was created to hear challenges to the validity of price control policies during World War 
II. See Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-421, ch. 26, § 204(b), 56 Stat. 23, 32 
(expired 1947) (limiting the grounds on which the court could hold a regulation or order illegal); 
id. § 204(c) (prohibiting a stay of enforcement of a regulation or order while a case was 
pending). For a discussion of these and other provisions intended to protect the price control 
program from judicial interference, see William Jerome Wilson, The Price Control Act of 1942, 
in THE BEGINNINGS OF OPA 1, 99–103 (Office of Temporary Controls ed., 1947). 
 209. For evidence supporting this hypothesis, see Huber & Gordon, supra note 130, at 248. 
 210. See supra Part I.C. 
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immigration cases by substituting a more specialized body for the 
courts of appeals in this field. 
Both the effects of current specialization and the prospective 
effects of enhanced specialization in the judiciary are best understood 
in relation to the other attributes of adjudication in the immigration 
field. The prospective effects are of several types, some of which are 
quite difficult to gauge. Despite this difficulty, these effects merit 
close examination in order to assess the impact and desirability of 
enhanced specialization in the adjudication of immigration cases. 
This Part begins by examining current specialization among the 
immigration adjudicators within the DOJ. It then discusses the degree 
of specialization in the immigration field among the federal courts of 
appeals. Finally, it turns to proposals that would move immigration 
cases from the courts of appeals to a more specialized body. 
A. Immigration Courts and the Board of Immigration Appeals 
Specialization in the bureaucracy is generally taken for granted. 
But it is not inevitable that the administrative adjudicators who 
decide immigration cases are specialists in that field. The existence of 
central panels of administrative judges in some states is a reminder 
that adjudication might be structured so that immigration is only one 
of many fields in which certain judges work.211 What difference does it 
make that the judges who adjudicate immigration cases in the 
executive branch are specialists? 
At the most basic level, specialization ensures that immigration 
judges and members of the BIA have great familiarity with their field. 
The recruitment of many judges with immigration experience means 
that a considerable portion of administrative adjudicators come to 
their jobs with a head start in the field. Even judges without prior 
immigration experience can become knowledgeable in a relatively 
short time when they hear nothing but immigration cases.212 Thus, 
immigration judges and BIA members undoubtedly have 
considerable expertise, which carries potential benefits for the 
efficiency and effectiveness with which they decide cases. The extent 
 
 211. For a discussion of central panels of administrative judges in the states, see Hoberg, 
supra note 158, at 78–81. 
 212. This is especially true if the specialized court has a supporting staff with expertise in 
immigration issues. To the extent that law clerks and other staff members in a specialized court 
are themselves specialists in the relevant field, they extend the benefits of the expertise that 
judges bring to a court or gain through their experience on the court. 
BAUM IN FINAL.DOC 3/30/2010  6:02:36 AM 
1548 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 59:1501 
of those benefits and other effects of specialization, however, depend 
heavily on other attributes of immigration adjudication within the 
DOJ. 
Of those other attributes, the difficulty of immigration cases 
looms the largest, especially for immigration judges. In the 
categorization of case difficulty discussed earlier,213 at least a 
substantial proportion of immigration cases falls into the most 
difficult category. In this category, even the high levels of expertise 
that flow from specialization may not be sufficient to overcome the 
inherent difficulty of reaching decisions. As a result, specialization 
might provide only limited benefits in enhancing the efficiency and 
effectiveness with which cases are decided. 
The time pressures on both immigration judges and members of 
the BIA compound the difficulties of immigration cases. As I have 
explained,214 it is plausible either that the experience and expertise 
gained from specialization are of little help when judges operate 
under severe caseload pressure or that specialization is of particular 
benefit under those conditions. In light of the difficulty of cases, 
however, the former possibility seems more likely.215 
If immigration cases were decided by administrative judges who 
worked in several other fields as well, the cumulative effects of case 
difficulty and time pressure likely would be reduced. Moving back 
and forth between immigration and other fields, members of central 
panels would get relief from the special problems that arise in 
immigration cases. If burnout weakens the quality of decisionmaking 
in immigration cases,216 administrative judges who are not specialists 
might be at an advantage in that respect. 
 
 213. See supra Part II.C.1. 
 214. See supra Part II.C.2. 
 215. Complaints by court of appeals judges and others about the quality of decisions by 
immigration judges should not be given too much weight, because these complaints are largely 
based on the most egregious judges and decisions. Still, the frequency and severity of these 
complaints strongly suggest that any positive effects of specialization on the quality of decisions 
are outweighed by the negative effects of case difficulty and caseload pressure. See Alexander, 
supra note 2, at 15–18 (discussing readily identifiable patterns of repeated errors in immigration 
cases); Benedetto, supra note 14, at 471–74 (noting criticism for a lack of transparency in the 
appointment process for immigration judges). The BIA has also been subject to strong criticism. 
See, e.g., Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 829–31 (7th Cir. 2005) (noting a history of 
criticism of immigration judges and the BIA on the Seventh Circuit); Westerland, supra note 95, 
at 14–15 (same). 
 216. See supra Part I.B. 
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The relationship between specialization and control over 
administrative judges in the immigration field depends in part on the 
arrangements that would exist in the absence of specialization. If the 
DOJ hired and supervised a central panel of administrative judges, 
then judges would still be under the control of a party with a stake in 
immigration cases. The situation would be quite different if an agency 
with no direct interest in case outcomes were responsible for the 
hiring and supervision of judges. With that complication, the 
relationship between specialization and control can be probed. 
Specialization facilitates ex ante control through the selection of 
judges on the basis of their perceived points of view on immigration 
issues. If the tendency to choose immigration judges and BIA 
members from government lawyers in the field217 reflects an effort to 
staff positions with judges favorable to the government’s position, 
that strategy would be far less likely to occur if immigration cases 
were just one part of a judge’s portfolio. If the DOJ held the power to 
appoint members of a central panel, its officials could choose 
government lawyers in the hope that they would be sympathetic to 
the government across the various fields of law addressed by the 
central panel. But that use of the selection power is a relatively blunt 
instrument. 
Similarly, the BIA’s specialization facilitated the ex post control 
that Attorney General Ashcroft exerted over the BIA.218 A generalist 
court under Justice Department supervision could instead carry out 
the functions of the BIA. Under that condition, it is unlikely that the 
attorney general would have removed members on the basis of their 
decisional record in immigration cases. 
The wide variation among immigration judges in the proportion 
of asylum claims they accept suggests that they possess a considerable 
degree of decisional independence, though recent efforts to reduce 
these disparities may achieve some success.219 To the extent that 
immigration judges have been independent, that independence leaves 
more room for specialization to shape their behavior. But the 
difficulty of the cases they decide and the strong pressure they feel to 
dispose of cases work in the other direction. The effects of these two 
 
 217. See supra Part I.C. 
 218. See supra Part I.C. 
 219. See supra Part I.C. The high rates with which some immigration judges accept asylum 
applications might reflect an assertiveness based on the self-confidence that specialization 
fosters. 
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attributes of adjudication within the DOJ likely outweigh any impact 
of specialization. 
B. The Federal Courts of Appeals 
As noted earlier, judges on the federal courts of appeals are 
fundamentally generalists, in that they hear a wide range of cases. 
Certainly, they see themselves as generalists.220 There are some 
elements of specialization in the courts of appeals, including a degree 
of specialization among judges in opinion writing.221 The agenda of 
each circuit and of its individual judges, however, is highly diverse.222 
In this context, the increased number of petitions to the courts of 
appeals for review of BIA decisions has had a striking effect. Today, a 
large percentage of the cases filed in two circuits come from the BIA. 
To make one comparison, those percentages in 2008—41 percent in 
the Second Circuit and 34 percent in the Ninth Circuit223—were both 
higher than the percentage of Federal Circuit filings that concerned 
patent law.224 At least those two circuits, then, could be regarded as 
quasi specialized in immigration cases.225 
If specialization enhances judges’ expertise and thus improves 
efficiency and effectiveness, judges on the Second and Ninth Circuits 
likely have secured that benefit. Because the preponderance of 
petitions for review of BIA decisions today involve asylum, judges in 
 
 220. E.g., Diane P. Wood, Generalist Judges in a Specialized World, 50 SMU L. REV. 1755, 
1756 (1997). For other references by court of appeals judges to their status as generalists, see 
Cheng, supra note 163, at 521 n.2. 
 221. Id. at 533–45. 
 222. E.g., id. at 540–46. The diversity of the cases heard by the courts of appeals as a whole 
is shown in ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 11, at 86–90. Analysis of case data 
compiled by the Federal Judicial Center indicates that circuits vary in their mixes of cases, but 
each circuit hears a wide range of cases. This analysis is based on data from the Inter-University 
Consortium of Political and Social Research, Federal Court Cases: Integrated Database, 2008, 
which may be downloaded at http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/25002; 
jsessionid=398D0E4929DD4BC31892EC0C98263ABF?q=federal+judicial+center. Most or all 
of the circuits require random assignment of cases to judges, and there is a general norm of 
random assignment. Cheng, supra note 163, at 523. 
 223. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 11, at 97, 100. 
 224. This percentage was 31 percent. U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT, 
APPEALS FILED, BY CATEGORY, FY 2008 (2008), http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/pdf/Chart 
Filings08.pdf. However, the 2009 proportion was higher, at 36 percent. U.S. COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT, supra note 169. In the same year, the proportion of Second and 
Ninth Circuit filings that came from the BIA dropped below 30 percent. See supra note 83 and 
accompanying text. 
 225. Westerland, supra note 95, at 17. 
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these two circuits have an especially good opportunity to develop 
expertise on that issue. 
As discussed,226 the influx of immigration cases into the Second 
and Ninth Circuits has exacerbated caseload pressures on these 
courts, spurring judges to adjust their procedures to cope with the 
problem. Serious as these pressures are, they seem considerably more 
limited than the very strong pressures on adjudicators within the 
DOJ. But these time pressures may limit the benefits of quasi 
specialization to some degree by giving court of appeals judges less 
opportunity to make effective use of the expertise they develop in the 
immigration field.227 
Both the prominence of immigration cases on the dockets of the 
Second and Ninth Circuits and the concentration of immigration 
cases in those circuits228 might lead to efforts to exert ex ante control 
over decisions in the two circuits through judicial appointments based 
on prospective positions on immigration issues. There is no evidence 
that this is the case; to the extent that appointments to the courts of 
appeals are driven by policy issues, immigration does not appear to be 
among these issues.229 Nor, it seems, are there many judges on the 
Second and Ninth Circuits, or any circuit, who have experience in the 
immigration field.230 
In most respects, then, judges on the Second and Ninth Circuits 
are in positions more similar to their colleagues on other circuits than 
to members of the two adjudicative bodies within the DOJ. Indeed, 
they may be similar to their colleagues in the extent of expertise they 
have gained from the increase in petitions for review of BIA 
 
 226. See supra Part I.B. 
 227. See supra Part II.C.2. 
 228. In fiscal year 2008, nearly three-quarters of all petitions for review of BIA decisions 
came to the Second and Ninth Circuits—45 percent in the Ninth and 28 percent in the Second. 
See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 11, at tbl.B-3 (listing the types and 
number of appeals by Circuit). In fiscal year 2009, the proportion was nearly two-thirds. Id. 
 229. See NANCY SCHERER, SCORING POINTS: POLITICIANS, ACTIVISTS, AND THE LOWER 
FEDERAL COURT APPOINTMENT PROCESS 50–74 (2005) (identifying criminal defendants’ rights, 
abortion, states’ rights, and civil rights as issues that affect the judicial appointment process). 
 230. One exception is Judge Carlos Bea of the Ninth Circuit, who not only handled some 
immigration cases as an attorney but was himself a successful litigant at the BIA. Immigration 
Litigation Reduction, supra note 10, at 8 (testimony of Carlos T. Bea, J., U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit). Judge Bea was nominated by President George W. Bush in 2003. If 
officials in the Bush administration had wanted to shape immigration policy on the courts of 
appeals through judicial appointments, they probably would not have chosen a judge who 
contested a government immigration decision in the BIA. 
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decisions.231 There were three other circuits—the Third, the Fifth, and 
the Eleventh—that received more than four hundred BIA cases in 
2009.232 The numbers of BIA cases were much lower in some circuits, 
but in most of these circuits, the numbers were large enough to give 
judges considerable familiarity with immigration law and 
adjudication.233 The volume of BIA-related litigation in the Seventh 
Circuit, for instance,234 was sufficient for Judge Posner to offer his 
well-publicized judgment about the failings of the immigration 
adjudication system in the DOJ.235 
Overall, the degree of specialization in immigration cases that 
has developed in the courts of appeals probably has not had much 
impact on judges’ decisions. The large volume of cases with which 
some circuits must cope may well affect the disposition of cases, but 
that is a different matter from specialization in itself. Caseload 
pressures aside, judges on the courts of appeals seem to treat appeals 
from the BIA in the same way that they treat other cases; that is, 
responding on the basis of their readings of the law and their policy 
preferences.236 
 
 231. The extent of this increase across the courts of appeals is striking. In 1984, the courts of 
appeals received only 490 cases that had been decided by the INS. (This total may have included 
only direct appeals from the INS, or it may have included cases that came up through the district 
courts.) The Ninth Circuit received more than 60 percent of these cases, leaving only 183 to be 
divided among panels and judges in the other circuits. See Stephen H. Legomsky, Forum 
Choices for the Review of Agency Adjudication: A Study of the Immigration Process, 71 IOWA L. 
REV. 1297, 1339 n.261 (1986). 
 232. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 11, at tbl.B-3. 
 233. See id. 
 234. Id. at 97 tbl. B-3. 
 235. Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 827, 829–30 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 236. To a considerable degree, these preferences seem to follow ideological lines. Two 
related studies found strong evidence that Democratic appointees in the Ninth Circuit were 
more favorable to asylum claims than Republican appointees. Joshua B. Fischman & David S. 
Law, What Is Judicial Ideology, and How Should We Measure It?, 29 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 
133, 192–203 (2009); David S. Law, Strategic Judicial Lawmaking: Ideology, Publication, and 
Asylum Law in the Ninth Circuit, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 817, 843–63 (2005). A less systematic 
analysis found suggestive evidence that Democratic and Republican appointees responded 
differently to asylum cases in the Sixth Circuit, but not in the Third Circuit. Ramji-Nogales et 
al., supra note 3, at 369–71. The same study found that differences in decisional tendencies 
across the circuits in 2004–2005 correlated fairly well with the ideological reputations of the 
circuits. Id. at 361–67. An analysis across all of the courts of appeals, using a measure of judges’ 
ideological positions that is more complicated than partisan affiliation, found a statistically 
significant relationship between those positions and asylum decisions in the 2003–2008 period 
but not in the 1998–2002 period. Westerland, supra note 95, at 38. 
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C. Replacing the Courts of Appeals with a Specialized Body 
Since at least the early 1980s, scholars and public policymakers 
have offered proposals for changes in the structure of adjudication for 
immigration cases that involve judicial specialization in some way.237 
These proposals vary considerably.238 Some, such as converting the 
BIA into an Article I court and otherwise leaving the adjudication 
structure unchanged,239 would not change the system’s level of 
specialization.240 But others would increase the level of specialization 
 
 237. See, e.g., SELECT COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION & REFUGEE POLICY, U.S. IMMIGRATION 
POLICY AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST 248–50 (1981) (suggesting the creation of an Article I 
immigration court); Peter J. Levinson, A Specialized Court for Immigration Hearings and 
Appeals, 56 NOTRE DAME LAW. 644, 651–55 (1981) (advocating a specialized judicial model for 
immigration courts); Maurice A. Roberts, Proposed: A Specialized Statutory Immigration Court, 
18 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 18–24 (1980) (suggesting the formation of a new Article I immigration 
court); see also Immigration Litigation Reduction, supra note 10, at 12–13 (testimony of John 
McCarthy Roll, J., U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona) (advocating for a 
consolidated immigration court); COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION, ABA, REFORMING THE 
IMMIGRATION SYSTEM: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 43–48 (2010), available at http://new.abanet.org/ 
Immigration/Documents/ReformingtheImmigrationSystemExecutiveSummary.pdf (considering 
the possibilities for restructuring immigration adjudication and proposing the creation of an 
Article I immigration court). Levinson’s proposal was a model for Roberts’s proposal. See 
Roberts, supra, at 19 n.63. 
 238. Legomsky, supra note 24, at 464–68. See generally Immigration Litigation Reduction, 
supra note 10 (discussing various reform proposals). In 2006, the Senate passed a bill that would 
have asked the Government Accountability Office to study three possible changes: 
(1) consolidating all such appeals into an existing circuit court, such as the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit; (2) consolidating all such appeals into 
a centralized appellate court consisting of active circuit court judges temporarily 
assigned from the various circuits, in a manner similar to the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court or the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals; or (3) 
implementing a mechanism by which a panel of active circuit court judges shall have 
the authority to reassign such appeals from circuits with relatively high caseloads to 
circuits with relatively low caseloads. 
S. 2611, 109th Cong. § 707 (2006). The House did not consider the bill. 
 239. Immigration Litigation Reduction, supra note 10, at 129–31 (statement of Doris 
Meissner, Senior Fellow; Muzaffar A. Chishti, Director; & Michael J. Whishnie, Fellow, 
Migration Policy Institute). Another proposal would move the adjudication of immigration 
cases from the DOJ to an independent agency in the executive branch. U.S. COMM’N ON 
IMMIGRATION REFORM, 1997 REPORT TO CONGRESS: BECOMING AN AMERICAN: 
IMMIGRATION AND IMMIGRANT POLICY 175–83 (1997), available at http://www.utexas.edu/ 
lbj/uscir/becoming/goals.pdf. 
 240. The adoption of such proposals could be consequential in other respects, however, by 
providing greater insulation of judges from ex post control. That is especially true of Article I 
status. Among specialized federal courts, the Tax Court and the Court of International Trade 
(formerly the Customs Court) began as executive branch bodies and later moved to the judicial 
branch. DUBROFF, supra note 193, at 165–215 (describing the evolution of the Tax Court); 
JOSEPH E. LOMBARDI, THE UNITED STATES CUSTOMS COURT: A HISTORY OF ITS ORIGIN AND 
EVOLUTION 52–62 (1976). There is no systematic evidence on the consequences of these shifts. 
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by shifting jurisdiction over applications for review of decisions by 
Justice Department adjudicators from the federal courts of appeals to 
a new body. 
This Section focuses on the latter set of proposals, which relate 
to this Article’s concern with the effects of judicial specialization. In 
light of the other attributes of adjudication in the immigration field, 
what might result from shifting cases from the courts of appeals to a 
more specialized body? Some significant effects are possible, 
including effects on the overall tenor of decisions in immigration 
cases. But these effects are not easily predicted. One reason is that 
they are contingent on other conditions, some of which are 
themselves unpredictable, such as the content of substantive and 
procedural rules that would accompany the creation of a new court. 
Another reason is that the impact of enhanced specialization would 
depend in large part on the form of specialization adopted by 
Congress. 
The proposals considered in this Section take three forms.241 In 
the first, immigration courts and the BIA would be converted into a 
new Article I immigration court with trial and appellate divisions, and 
the courts of appeals would no longer have a role in reviewing 
administrative decisions in immigration.242 There has been 
considerable change in the adjudication of immigration cases since 
the early 1980s, when proposals of this type were made.243 These 
proposals, however, could be applied to the current situation. 
 
 241. Other forms could be (and may have been) suggested. The discussion in this Part 
focuses on the three forms described here. 
 242. Levinson, supra note 237, at 651–55; Roberts, supra note 237, at 18–24. It is uncertain 
whether a structure in which immigration cases did not go to any Article III courts prior to 
Supreme Court review on certiorari would run into constitutional problems. One commentary 
on the Roberts proposal concluded that the question was open. Robert E. Juceam & Stephen 
Jacobs, Constitutional and Policy Considerations of an Article I Immigration Court, 18 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 29, 35–43 (1980). A leading commentary on the question of when Article III 
courts are required pointed to the unclear state of Supreme Court doctrine but argued for an 
interpretation under which appellate review by an Article III court is required. Richard H. 
Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article III, 101 HARV. L. REV. 
916, 943–49 (1988). Under that interpretation, the author argued, the use of administrative 
courts to decide immigration cases was acceptable because of the role of the courts of appeals. 
Id. at 967–70. For a more recent analysis that reflects the continued uncertainty about when 
Article III courts are required, see David A. Case, Article I Courts, Substantive Rights, and 
Remedies for Government Misconduct, 26 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 101, 191–211 (2005). 
 243. See Executive Office for Immigration Review, supra note 117, at 41–44 (statement of 
Stephen H. Legomsky, Professor, Washington University School of Law) (discussing the 
changes in immigration adjudication over time). 
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In the second form, the Federal Circuit would take the place of 
the courts of appeals. Senator Arlen Specter offered this proposal, 
which was considered at a 2006 hearing of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee.244 Some number of judges would be added to the Federal 
Circuit to help the court handle the new caseload. 
In the third form, cases would go to a court composed of Article 
III federal judges who serve temporarily, and perhaps part-time, on 
that court. The Chief Justice would designate the judges for this 
court. Senior Judge Jon Newman of the Second Court suggested this 
type of court at the 2006 Senate hearing,245 and Professor Stephen 
Legomsky presents a detailed proposal of this type in his article for 
this Symposium.246 Such a court would be similar to the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court, which draws judges from the district 
courts, and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review, 
which draws judges from the district courts and courts of appeals.247 In 
the past, there were other federal courts that borrowed their judges 
from the district courts and courts of appeals, including the 
Emergency Court of Appeals (1942–61) and the Temporary 
Emergency Court of Appeals (1971–93).248 
The primary rationales for proposals taking any of these three 
forms have been achieving greater uniformity in immigration law 
through the elimination of rulings by multiple courts of appeals249 and 
(in the current period) providing relief to overburdened courts of 
 
 244. Immigration Litigation Reduction, supra note 10, at 2 (statement of Sen. Specter, 
Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary). 
 245. Id. at 10–11 (testimony of Jon O. Newman, J., U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit). 
 246. Legomsky, supra note 68, at 1710–20. The Legomsky proposal would replace the BIA 
and the courts of appeals with a new Court of Appeals for Immigration. Id. at 1686, 1714. The 
court would be staffed by judges from the district courts and courts of appeals. Id. at 1686–87, 
1714. Judges would serve full-time on the immigration court during their period of service on 
this court for a fixed term, perhaps of two years. Id. at 1686, 1714. 
 247. 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a) (2006) (setting forth procedures for selecting judges for the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court); id. § 1803(b) (setting forth procedures for selecting judges for 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Review Court). 
 248. Theodore W. Ruger, The Judicial Appointment Power of the Chief Justice, 7 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 341, 359–67 (2004) (discussing the Emergency Court of Appeals and the Temporary 
Emergency Court of Appeals, along with other courts that borrowed their judges). 
 249. Immigration Litigation Reduction, supra note 10, at 8 (testimony of Carlos T. Bea, J., 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit); Levinson, supra note 237, at 653; Roberts, supra 
note 237, at 20. 
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appeals.250 Additional rationales are that consolidation of cases in a 
single court would eliminate forum shopping by individuals who 
challenge BIA rulings251 and enhance the expertise with which cases 
are decided.252 These issues are important, but the potential impact of 
judicial specialization is not limited to them. Thus, consideration of 
the effects of adopting any of these proposals should be framed more 
broadly. 
Because the body of empirical data about the effects of judicial 
specialization is slim,253 and because these effects are complex and 
contingent, any effort to estimate the effects of adopting these 
proposals is highly imperfect. But an analysis that takes into account 
both what we know about judicial specialization and the attributes of 
adjudication in immigration law can offer some ways of thinking 
about the impact of moving cases from the courts of appeals to a 
more specialized body.254 
First, it is unlikely that specialization would provide substantial 
benefits through enhanced judicial expertise. Whatever advantages 
expertise provides, a shift in jurisdiction would not greatly enhance 
these advantages. The courts of appeals already hear a large number 
of immigration cases, three-quarters of which are heard in the two 
circuits in which immigration constitutes a large share of the 
agenda.255 Even if immigration cases were transferred to a new court 
whose judges hear only immigration cases, it is not clear that its 
judges would become any more expert in the field than the judges of 
the Second and Ninth Circuits are today. 
 
 250. Immigration Litigation Reduction, supra note 10, at 12 (testimony of John McCarthy 
Roll, J., U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona). 
 251. Id. at 29 (testimony of David A. Martin, Professor, University of Virginia School of 
Law). 
 252. Id. at 12 (testimony of John McCarthy Roll). 
 253. See supra note 127 and accompanying text. 
 254. The set of suggestions that follows is my own. For an insightful analysis of the effects of 
establishing a specialized immigration court, see Legomsky, supra note 24, at 464–68. Professor 
Legomsky concludes that, on balance, substituting a specialized court for the courts of appeals 
would be undesirable. “The advantages of generalist review, especially in an area in which 
fundamental liberty interests are at stake, are in my view enough to outweigh any marginal 
consistency gains from specialization.” Id. at 468; see also Legomsky, supra note 231, at 1386–96 
(analyzing the specialized immigration court proposals of the 1980s). Professor Legomsky’s own 
proposal for a Court of Appeals for Immigration was designed to avoid the negative effects of 
specialization by giving jurisdiction over appeals to judges who have substantial experience in 
the generalist federal courts. Legomsky, supra note 68, at 1694–96. 
 255. See supra note 228 and accompanying text. 
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Second, the effects of specialization on time pressures would 
depend primarily on the judicial personnel provided to the new court. 
If immigration cases were reallocated to a set of judges borrowed 
from all the circuits, without any increase in the number of court of 
appeals judges, the reallocation would decrease pressures on the 
circuits that have received the largest numbers of immigration cases. 
By the same token, however, it would increase pressures on circuits 
that lose more judicial person-hours than immigration cases currently 
cost them. 
If instead cases went to the Federal Circuit or to a new court, 
Congress would decide on the number of judges to allocate to the 
court in question. Senator Specter’s 2006 proposal would have given 
immigration cases to the Federal Circuit but would have added only 
three judges to that court, which would have overwhelmed the 
Federal Circuit and its judges.256 If Congress were generous in 
providing judges to the Federal Circuit or to a specialized 
immigration court, it could substantially ease caseload pressures on 
the Second and Ninth Circuits and allow immigration cases to be 
decided under less severe time constraints. Such generosity, of course, 
is not guaranteed. 
Third, a reduction in the number of judges deciding asylum cases 
would probably produce greater homogeneity of judicial standards on 
asylum issues and thus greater uniformity in judicial policy. This 
effect is hardly certain, because the number of judges in the field 
would still be large enough to allow for considerable variation in 
standards. Probably a stronger force for homogeneity would be 
mechanisms that can operate within a single court—en banc hearings 
and judges’ acceptance of precedents established by prior panels. The 
experience of the Federal Circuit in patent law, however, cautions 
against assuming that concentration of cases in a single court will 
produce a high level of uniformity in the law.257 
Fourth, it is quite difficult to predict how judges’ experience on a 
specialized immigration court would affect their perceptions and 
perspectives. The self-confidence they develop could make them 
more willing to overturn administrative rulings against individuals. 
Alternatively, their central role in shaping asylum policy might make 
them more reluctant to interfere with executive branch policy. The 
 
 256. See Immigration Litigation Reduction, supra note 10, at 3–5 (testimony of Paul R. 
Michel, C.J., U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit). 
 257. See supra note 173. 
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potential for either of these effects should not be exaggerated, given 
the large number of immigration cases already decided by judges in 
some circuits. In this respect, only a court in which judges hear 
nothing but immigration cases throughout their judicial careers would 
be very different from the status quo. Another possible effect is that 
fully specialized judges would come to see immigration issues from an 
insular perspective, losing the broader perspective of generalist 
judges.258 
Fifth, the collective views of the judges who decide immigration 
appeals almost surely would change if jurisdiction is transferred to a 
single court, simply because one set of judges would replace another. 
No matter which form of specialization is adopted, only by chance 
would the distribution among the judges deciding immigration cases 
match the distribution of views among the judges who currently 
decide them. The smaller the group of judges deciding cases in a 
particular field, the more likely that they will collectively lean in a 
particular direction. 
The impact of having a different set of judges decide immigration 
cases would be considerably greater if judges were selected on the 
basis of their perceived views about immigration issues. The 
incentives of officials selecting these judges to seek ex ante control of 
the court through appointments would depend on the form of 
specialization adopted. If jurisdiction over immigration cases were 
transferred to the Federal Circuit, these cases would constitute only 
one of several fields in which that court works. To the extent that 
appointments to the Federal Circuit are made on the basis of policy 
considerations, executive branch officials who choose judges would 
have to weigh immigration against other fields such as patents.259 
In contrast, a stand-alone court that decided only immigration 
cases would require no such weighing. If selecting officials wanted to 
use appointments to shape court policy, they could focus on 
 
 258. See Timothy S. Barker, A Critique of the Establishment of a Specialized Immigration 
Court, 18 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 25, 27 (1980). Another type of effect that might occur is a 
negative reaction to the repetition of cases in a single field. In light of concerns about burnout 
among immigration judges, it is interesting that Senator John Cornyn used the same term to 
refer to this potential effect for appellate judges who heard only immigration cases. Immigration 
Litigation Reduction, supra note 10, at 15 (statement of Sen. Cornyn, Member, S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary). 
 259. Still, there has been some concern that immigration politics would come into play in the 
selection of federal circuit judges. See, e.g., Editorial, Don’t Tamper with the Courts, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 7, 2006, at A24. 
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ascertaining the views of prospective appointees on immigration 
issues. Leaving aside the difficulties that can arise in that effort, the 
question is whether policy considerations would dominate other 
considerations such as patronage. The history of appointments to 
federal specialized courts indicates that patronage is sometimes the 
primary consideration.260 The history of appointments of immigration 
judges and members of the BIA does not lead to any clear predictions 
about how executive branch officials would use the power of 
appointment to a specialized immigration court.261 
If White House legal staff members and DOJ officials did select 
judges on the basis of policy considerations, it seems likely that they 
would favor nominees who seemed inclined to favor the 
government’s position. An administration sympathetic to immigrants, 
however, might take a different approach. 
If the Chief Justice designated judges to serve temporarily on a 
specialized immigration court, the Chief might use this power to staff 
the court primarily with judges who reflect the Chief’s own point of 
view. Although this possibility may seem highly speculative, Professor 
Theodore Ruger has presented evidence indicating that Chief Justices 
Burger and Rehnquist favored Republican appointees in choosing 
judges for specialized courts.262 Thus, any evaluation of this form of 
specialization should take into account the record of the sitting Chief 
Justice on immigration issues.263 
 
 260. See supra note 197 and accompanying text. 
 261. See supra Part I.C. 
 262. Ruger, supra note 248, at 390–95, 397–401. In the case of the Special Division of the 
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, which chose special counsel for investigations of criminal 
allegations against high-level officials of the executive branch, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s 
appointments to the Special Division arguably led to the impeachment of President Clinton. See 
JEFFREY TOOBIN, A VAST CONSPIRACY: THE REAL STORY OF THE SEX SCANDAL THAT 
NEARLY BROUGHT DOWN A PRESIDENT 70–73 (1999). 
 263. Chief Justice Roberts’s record on these issues thus far is too slim to provide a basis for 
firm conclusions about his views. See Kucana v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 827 (2010) (joining a 
unanimous decision favorable to the individual); Nijhawan v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2294 (2009) 
(joining a unanimous decision favorable to the government); Nken v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1749 
(2009) (writing a majority opinion favorable to the individual); Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 
1159 (2009) (joining a majority opinion somewhat favorable to the individual); Dada v. 
Mukasey, 128 S. Ct. 2307 (2008) (joining a dissenting opinion favorable to the government); 
Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183 (2007) (joining a majority opinion favorable to the 
government); Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47 (2006) (joining a majority opinion favorable to the 
individual); Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30 (2006) (joining a majority opinion 
favorable to the government). 
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Sixth, specialization might increase control of court policy 
through ex post mechanisms. Any such effect would probably be 
slight, however, so long as the court was staffed by Article III judges. 
Federal Circuit judges and judges designated for temporary duty on a 
specialized court would retain Article III protections. Because of the 
continuing diversity of cases they would hear,264 they would not be 
subject to the more subtle pressures that judges who decide cases in a 
single field might feel. 
Supplanting the courts of appeals with a court of Article I judges 
could have a more substantial effect, because judges on that court 
might be concerned about reappointment. But there is little evidence 
about this effect in other fields.265 Regardless of the effect on sitting 
judges, executive branch officials could make reappointment 
decisions on the basis of judges’ decisional records. The efficacy of 
that approach would depend heavily on the length of judges’ terms 
and their interest in reappointment. 
Finally, the decisions of a new specialized court in immigration 
law would depend to a considerable degree on the substantive and 
procedural rules that Congress adopted when it established the court. 
Legislation that shifts immigration cases from the courts of appeals to 
a specialized court would give members of Congress an opportunity 
to adopt new rules for court review of decisions by adjudicators in the 
executive branch. As it has done in other instances,266 Congress might 
adopt rules that are intended to favor one side or the other—to make 
review of BIA decisions either more or less favorable to the 
individuals who petition for review. To take one possibility, if 
Congress were collectively unsympathetic to asylum seekers, its lack 
of sympathy likely would result in rules that favored the government’s 
legal position. The effects of such changes might be far greater than 
the effect of transferring jurisdiction from the courts of appeals to 
another court. 
CONCLUSION 
Part III’s discussion of current and potential judicial 
specialization in immigration law emphasized the complexity and 
 
 264. In a court of designated judges from the various circuits, immigration might constitute 
full-time work for a certain period, but that period would still constitute only a portion of the 
judges’ work in the long term. 
 265. But see Hendrickson, supra note 129, at 94–192. 
 266. See supra note 208 and accompanying text. 
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contingency of the effects of specialization. It is difficult to ascertain 
what difference it makes that administrative adjudicators in the 
immigration field are fully specialized or that a degree of 
specialization in the field has developed in the courts of appeals. It is 
even more difficult to predict how, and how much, decisions on 
petitions for review of decisions by adjudicators in the executive 
branch would change if jurisdiction were transferred from the courts 
of appeals to another body. For the same reason, assessments of the 
desirability of such a transfer should be made with considerable 
caution.267 
One lesson of this Article’s analysis is that policymakers who 
consider proposals for change in the structure of adjudication of 
immigration cases should recognize the complex relationship between 
specialization and other attributes of adjudication. In other fields of 
law, the potential effects of specialization sometimes have been 
exaggerated or overlooked because of inadequate attention to other 
attributes that shape the work of courts. Decisions about judicial 
specialization in any field should be made with careful consideration 
of the potential effects, including the uncertainties that exist in 
predicting those effects. 
 
 267. The relative benefits and drawbacks of specialization will vary among fields of law. For 
a discussion of characteristics of fields that should be taken into account, see LEGOMSKY, supra 
note 155, at 20–32. 
